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Résumé
Le but de cette thèse est de relier la valorisation des produits dérivés à
l’analyse par scénario qui fait référence dans la gestion des banques. La val-
orisation des options est un domaine qui a donné lieu à une très large littéra-
ture avec un cadre mathématique bien défini, développé plutôt à destination
des praticiens de la finance de marché dans l’optique d’une couverture par ré-
plication. La gestion du risque de ces produits est donc analysée sous l’angle
du fameux principe d’absence d’opportunité d’arbitrage. Selon ce principe,
l’estimation pour un taux futur devient celle qu’anticipe les marchés dès au-
jourd’hui grâce à la présence d’instrument de couverture. D’un autre côté, le
pilotage financier en entreprise se base sur une approche dite “par scénario”.
Différents scénarios qui semblent perspicaces et font sens économiquement
pour les dirigeants de la banques sont retenus, et une projection pour chaque
scénario est étudiée. Ces scénarios ne sont en général pas probabilisés; nous
sommes dans une modélisation de l’incertain où la notion de probabilité et
d’espérance n’intervient pas. La banque, qui possède des produits complexes
liés à son activité, ne se couvre pas comme le fait un service lié à des ac-
tivités de marché. C’est dans l’étude de ce cadre d’analyse que s’inscrit la
thèse. Nous analysons ce besoin de projection par scénario sur le périmètre
des produits complexes.
L’introduction établit le cadre bancaire et plus précisément la réglementation
bancaire afin de situer la thèse dans ce contexte.
Le chapitre 1 est un chapitre préliminaire qui rappelle les notions fondamen-
tales de valorisation d’options.
Le chapitre 21 étudie la valorisation des options bermudéennes “cross de-
vises”. Ces produits, avec options de remboursement anticipé, sont assez
fréquents dans le bilan des banques. Nous proposons notamment une cal-
1
Le chapitre 2 a été présenté sous la forme d’un papier de recherche à la “32th Inter-
national Conference of the French Finance Association” et à la “8th International Finance
Conference” en 2015.
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ibration adaptée aux produits de long terme, la maturité longue étant une
autre des propriétés de ces produits de bilan. Une étude d’impacts finalise ce
chapitre. Nous étudions l’impact de chaque marché d’options, qui sont des
sources de risque, sur la valorisation de notre produit structuré.
Le chapitre 3 définit un cadre de projection des surfaces de volatilités im-
plicites. Cette outil nous permet ainsi de relier les anticipations des marchés
d’option avec un scénario de taux qui fait référence en pilotage bancaire.
Le chapitre 4 analyse les stress-tests avec une vision “grand angle”. Nous
énonçons les principes d’un stress-test et discutons des différences et prob-
lèmes de comptabilité de cet outil, très utilisé en pilotage bancaire, avec
la modélisation risque neutre utilisée dans la valorisation d’options. Nous
terminons notre étude en analysant les résultats des banques françaises du
stress-test EBA 2016.
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Abstract
The aim of this thesis is to link the pricing of derivative products to the sce-
nario based analysis used in banks management. Options’ pricing has a wide
literature and a well-defined mathematical framework focusing on the market
finance problematics and in particular on delta hedging. The risk manage-
ment of these products are thus analyzed with this point of view based on
the famous absence of arbitrage opportunity principle. Under this principle,
the best estimates for tomorrow are those anticipated by the market today
due to the presence of hedging instruments. On the other side, corporate fi-
nancial management is based on a scenario based approach. Senior managers
select scenarios which seem both interesting and plausible and a projection
for each scenario is analyzed. Generally, we do not attribute probability to
the scenarios, which implies a modeling based on uncertainty where the no-
tion of probability and mathematical expectation are not involved. Bank has
complex products for the needs of its activity and it does not hedge them as
a service related to market activities would do. We do our analyze in this
framework. We analyze this need of scenario based projection for complex
products.
The introduction defines the banking framework and more specially the bank-
ing regulatory and links our thesis to this context
Chapter 1 is a preliminary chapter which provides the basic notions on deriva-
tive pricing.
Chapter 22 details the pricing of cross-currency bermuda derivatives. These
early redemption products are common on the balance sheet of the banks.
We propose a calibration method for long term products. Indeed another
property of this funding product is a long maturity. We end the chapter
with an impact study where we analyze the impacts of the different volatility
2
The chapter 2 is a working paper that was presented at the 32th International Confer-
ence of the French Finance Association and at the 8th International Finance Conference
in 2015.
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markets, which we consider as risk factors, to the price of the product.
Chapter 3 proposes a projection model for implied volatility surface. This
tool allows to link implied volatility projections with an interest rate scenario
which is a key element of financial management.
Chapter 4 focuses on stress-testing. We define the principle of stress-testing
and discuss the differences and incompatibility problems of this modeling
(very common on banks management) with the risk neutral modeling (which
is the common modeling in derivative pricing). We end our study with a part
dedicated to 2016 EBA stress-test results of French banks.
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Introduction: Pilotage Bancaire
1 Le Rôle de la Banque dans l’Economie
Le rôle principal de la banque reste le financement de l’économie réelle. La
banque récolte les dépôts des clients qui sont liquides (disponibles à tout
moment) et finance les crédits long terme. Elle s’engage donc à garantir le
capital des dépôts à vue des clients. Elle subit donc le risque de crédit porté
à son actif. Elle subit également par définition de son activité un risque
potentiel de liquidité, potentiel car historiquement les dépôts à terme des
clients ne s’écoulent pas aussi rapidement. Elle s’engage à transformer en
monnaie fiduciaire à tout moment les dépôts des clients. La gestion de ce
risque de liquidité revient donc à la banque. En plus de ce risque de liquidité,
la banque fait face à un risque de taux qui provient de la différence de taux
entre les dépôts et les crédits. De plus, les banques françaises ont la spécificité
d’accorder des prêts à taux fixe justifié par des dépôts majoritairement à
taux fixe (plus précisement à taux zéro). Cette exposition à des taux fixes
entraine une sensibilité de la marge nette d’intérêt dégagée de l’activité de
crédit-dépôts. Ces risques de bilan sont gérés par le service ALM des banques.
En plus de l’activité de banque de détail comme détaillée plus haut, les
banques ont aussi des activités d’investissement et de financement (BFI).
Ces activités de marché qui viennent s’ajouter au rôle de financement de
l’économie réelle s’inscrivent dans la logique de banque universelle qui pré-
domine notamment en France.
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2 Du Bilan et Compte de Résultat aux Ressources
Rares Bancaires
Le bilan et le compte de résultat sont les deux éléments centraux de la banque.
Ces deux jeux de données permettent un pilotage stratégique de la banque.
Nous pouvons en effet en extraire beaucoup d’informations sur la banque
et plus précisement sur ce que l’on appelle les ressources rares bancaires:
rentabilité, solvabilité et liquidité. Ces indicateurs qui résument la situation
financière de la banque sont au centre des préoccupations car ils permet-
tent une analyse approfondie du business model et de l’appétit au risque
de l’entreprise. C’est d’ailleurs sur les notions de solvabilité et de liquidité
(qui sont les indicateurs reflétant la partie “risque”) que les régulateurs vont
mettre des contraintes afin de s’assurer d’une stabilité du système financier.
Le bilan détaille les emplois et les ressources de la banque ou en d’autres
termes comment elle se finance et comment elle met à profit ce financement
pour générer du résultat. Le bilan d’une banque est de ce fait capital car
c’est en majorité du bilan que proviennent les risques, une partie importante
du résultat, et la liquidité.
C’est également au travers du bilan que l’on peut influer sur la notion de so-
lidité financière de l’entreprise en jouant sur la décomposition dette - capital.
Cet arbitrage dette-capital influe sur la solvabilité tout comme les risques. Il
est bon de préciser qu’aujourd’hui une analyse plus fine du passif est réalisée
dans le cadre des mesures concernant la résolution (TLAC, MREL, Bail-in).
La classification du passif n’est plus binaire mais toute une subordination du
passif se met en place.
Les risques issus du bilan sont matérialisés par le calcul de RWA qui se décom-
pose en 3 catégories: risque de crédit, risque de marché et risque opérationnel
(pour ce dernier il n’y a pas forcément de lien avec le bilan). La solvabilité
est exprimée en fonction des RWA; elle représente le ratio de capitaux sur le
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Table .1: Compte de résultat
Marge nette d’intérêt (1)
Commissions (2)
Autres revenus (3) (dont résulats des positions à la juste valeur)
Produit net bancaire (4) = (1) + (2) + (3)
Frais généraux (5) (dont salaires)
Résultat brut économique (6) = (4) - (5)
Coût du risque (7)
Impôts (8)
Résultat (9) = (6) - (7) - (8)
Table .2: Bilan
Actif Passif
comptes banque centrale et assimilés dettes banque centrales
portefeuille financier dépôts clients et livrets
crédits clientels dettes: titres et emprunts
autres (immobilisation, goodwill, ...) fonds propres
risque.
C’est également via le bilan que l’on obtient les différentes métriques de liq-
uidité reglémentaire introduit par Bâle 3: LCR pour la liquidité court terme
(1 mois) et le NSFR pour la liquidité long terme (1 an). Alors que le LCR
impose d’avoir plus d’actifs liquides que de dépôts liquides, le NSFR impose
d’avoir moins de besoins de ressources stables que de ressources disponibles.
Il est bon de préciser que nous avons un lieu direct entre le bilan et le compte
de résultat pour les revenus en marge nette d’intérêt. C’est en effet les
encours des différents produits du bilan combinés avec les taux d’intérêt qui
nous donnent le résultat issu de la marge d’intérêt.
Nous exposons dans la Table 1 et la Table 2 une description des grandes
catégories de résultats et bilanciels (classées par liquidité décroissante).
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3 La Réglementation Bancaire
3.1 Sur l’utilité d’une réglementation bancaire
La réglementation permet une surveillance des banques. Elle a pour objectif
d’inciter les banques à une gestion des risques plus prudente[2]. Le rôle cen-
tral des banques dans le financement de l’économie réelle place ces dernières
dans un cadre assez spécial. Pour éviter la fuite des dépôts massive en temps
d’incertitude économique, les gouvernements mettent en place des fonds de
garantie des dépôts (jusqu’à 100 000 euros par client et par banque pour
le Fonds de Garantie des Dépôts et de Résolution), ce qui présente un aléa
moral : les déposants ne se soucient plus du risque de défaut et de ce fait de
la gouvernance ainsi que de la bonne gestion des risques de leurs banques.
C’est donc les superviseurs qui prennent le rôle de surveillance de la bonne
gestion des banques. Différents acteurs sont impliqués dans cette surveil-
lance. La Banque Centrale Européenne est le superviseur pour le contrôle
prudentiel. Le Single Resolution Board a en charge la supervision de la réso-
lution. L’European Banking Authority a un rôle plutôt sur l’aspect norme et
méthodologie aussi bien pour le prudentiel que pour la résolution. De plus,
chaque pays a une autorité tutelle locale qui fait le lien entre les banques
du pays et les superviseurs européens. En France, ce role est assuré par le
Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel et de Résolution. Dans ce qui suit, nous
décrivons le cadre actuel du contrôle prudentiel.
La supervision prudentielle est bâtie sur 3 piliers :
• Exigence minimale de fonds propres
• Processus de surveillance prudentielle
• Discipline de marché
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3.2 Le Pilier 1
Le pilier 1 exige un niveau minimum de capital pour les 3 types de risques
majeurs auxquels une banque est exposée :
• le risque de crédit
• le risque de marché
• le risque opérationnel
Il y a d’ailleurs eu des discussions entre le comité de Bâle et les banques sur
l’inclusion du risque de taux d’intérêt dans le pilier 1. Au final, les banques
ont eu gain de cause et le risque de taux du portefeuille bancaire (IRRBB)
est resté dans le pilier 2 avec une méthodologie qui reste assez libre mais
cependant avec un formalisme plus cadré qu’auparavant. Les trois risques
pilier 1 sont donc comptabilisés par le biais des RWA. Le risque de crédit
peut être calculé en méthode standard ou en modèle avec notations internes
(IRB) qui lui-même se décompose en deux : IRB Fondation ou IRB avancée.
Dans IRBF, seule la probabilité de défaillance est estimée par la banque alors
qu’en IRBA tous les paramètres sont estimés par la banque par des modèles
internes [1]. Comme le qualifie Brunel dans [1], IRB est un modèle externe
avec un paramétrage interne.
Pour le calcul du risque de marché, la banque a le choix entre la méthode
standard et ses modèles internes et notamment VaR, VaR stressée, IRC,
CRM. Ainsi, les modèles internes permettent de capter les risques liés à
des périodes de stress (VaR stressée) et les risques de crédit / migration du
portefeuille de négociations (IRC, CRM). [3]
Le risque opérationnel peut être calculé par 3 méthodes :
• approche de base, forfaitaire par rapport au PNB de la banque;
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Figure .1: SREP
• approche standard, forfaitaire par rapport au PNB par ligne de métier;
• approche avancée, reposant sur des modèles internes validés par les
autorités de tutelle.
3.3 Le Pilier 2
L’objectif du pilier 2 est d’assurer une cohérence entre le profil de risque
des banques, la gestion de leurs risques et la planification du capital. Deux
documents sont à fournir par les banques dans le cadre du pilier 2 : l’ICAAP
et l’ILAAP.
L’ICAAP traite de la capitalisation de la banque pour les différents risques
supportés. Il met notamment en lien le business model, l’appétit au risque, le
stress-testing afin d’en déduire un niveau de capital adéquat pour la banque.
L’ILAAP traite de la stratégie de gestion de la liquidité de la banque. La
banque y expose une description détaillée de la gestion de la liquidité et
du financement : plan de refinancement, circulation de la liquidité dans le
groupe, indicateur quantitatif, gestion du risque de liquidité. . .
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Le processus “Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process” (SREP) permet
au régulateur de s’assurer de la bonne gestion de la banque (notamment
sur les stratégies, processus, mécanismes, niveau de capital et gestion de la
liquidité) par rapport aux risques encourus3. Il repose sur 4 éléments qui
sont :
• “Business Model Assessment” : une analyse de la profitabilité de la
banque et notamment une étude sur :
– La viabilité du modèle d’entreprise qui correspond à la capacité
de l’entreprise à générer du résultat sur une période d’un an;
– La durabilité de la stratégie de l’entreprise qui correspond à la
capacité à générer du résultat sur une période de 3 ans avec les
hypothèses du plan stratégique et des prévisions financières in-
ternes.
• “Gouvernance and Risk Management Assessment” (Evaluation de la
gouvernance interne et des contrôles): Evaluation de la conformité de
la gouvernance interne aux standards et de la gestion des risques de la
banque. Cette partie permet de s’assurer que la gouvernance interne et
les contrôles au sein de l’institution sont adaptés à son profil de risque,
son business model, sa taille et sa complexité. Les éléments clés de la
notation sont :
– La structure de gouvernance globale;
– La culture corporate et culture risques;
– L’organisation et fonctionnement des organes de direction;
– les pratiques de rémunération;
– Le contrôle interne;
3
http://www.eba.europa.eu/regulation-and-policy/supervisory-review-and-evaluation-
srep-and-pillar-2
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– La structure de gestion des risques (incluant ICAAP et ILAAP);
– Les systèmes d’information;
– Le plan de résolution.
• “Assessment of risks to Capital”: adéquation du niveau de capital aux
risques encourus (ICAAP) et leurs “benchmarking” face aux autres ban-
ques.
• “Assessment of risks to Liquidity and Funding”: évaluation de la ges-
tion de la liquidité et du financement (ILAAP). Différents éléments sur
la liquidité (besoin intraday, court et long terme, “buffers”, stress-test
liquidité réglementaire) et sur le financement (profil de refinancement,
accès au marché) sont prises en considération dans cette partie.
Le régulateur utilise ces informations afin de calculer un score quantitatif
en comparant notamment les résultats de la banque avec les résultats de
ses paires. Une couche qualitative est ajoutée à ce score quantitatif afin
d’obtenir le score final qui correspond à un niveau de capital supplémentaire
à rajouter au niveau de capital exigé au titre du pilier 1. Ce niveau de capital
au titre du SREP est annoncé par la BCE à la banque en laissant libre sa
communication ou non au marché par la banque elle-même. Ce niveau est
appelé lors de l’exercice du SREP 2016 le Pilier 2 Requirement. Il détermine
le niveau de MDA (“Maximum Distribution Amount”). Ce niveau qui se place
sur la couche pilier 1 et des buffers augmentés de la couche P2G entraîne des
restrictions sur les distributions de dividendes, les paiements de coupons d’
Additional Tier 1 et le paiement de bonus. Il est prévu qu’il soit déclenché
dès que les exigences au titre du pilier 1 et P2G ne sont pas respectées.
Au dessus de cette couche P2G, nous plaçons les différents buffers. Au dessus
de ces buffers, nous avons la couche Pilier 2 Guidance (P2G) qui correspond
à un niveau de capital couvrant les risques de crises provenant des résultats
22
Figure .2: Composition des différentes couches de capital
quantitatifs du stress-test EBA (les résulats qualitatifs provenant de la ges-
tion du stress-test viennent alimenter le P2R). Ce niveau n’entraine pas une
réaction directe des régulateurs. Cependant la banque aura à justifier son
non respect.
4 Objectif et Organisation de la Thèse
Dans ce contexte réglementaire, nous voyons donc clairement qu’il y a une
séparation entre les exigences de capital qui viennent couvrir les risques en-
courus dans un régime de croisière (P1, buffers, P2R) et les exigences venant
couvrir des risques survenant d’une situation de crise (P2G). C’est à la mod-
élisation des crises exrêmes que la thèse s’intéresse. Dans ce contexte de pro-
jection des éléments du bilan et du résultat bancaire sur la base d’un scénario
de crise, nous allons nous intéresser tout particulièrement à la projection de
la valorisation des produits structurés qui sont construits sur une logique de
risque-neutralité qui n’est pas naturellement compatible avec les approches
par scénarios. La façon la plus naturelle revient à conserver la logique risque
23
Figure .3: les liens de causalité en valorisation de produits structurés
neutre de la valorisation tout en projetant les facteurs de risques tels que les
taux d’intérêt et la volatilité implicite.
En général, dans le cadre de ces stress-tests, le méthodologie EBA impose une
régle simplificatrice sur le remboursement anticipés des émissions. Lorsque
l’option est à la main de la contrepartie, elle est supposée être exécutée dès
la première date d’option alors que les options à la main de la banque ne
sont jamais exécutées.
La thèse se penche sur cette problématique avec une approche de type “bottom-
up”. Dans notre thèse, l’échelon le plus fin correspond à la valorisation d’un
produit structuré avec toutes les subtilités techniques qui y sont associées.
Après un chapitre préliminaire rappelant quelques notions techniques, nous
commençons par un chapitre (chapitre 2) qui s’intéresse à la méthodologie de
valorisation d’un type assez commun de produits structurés. Ce chapitre est
dédié à l’implémentation informatique et repose surtout sur les applications
numériques.
Le chapitre 3 ajoute à l’aspect méthode de valorisation une approche économique
qui permet déjà de faire un premier lien entre le pilotage financier bancaire
et la valorisation des produits structurés. Cette partie contient également en
majorité l’exploitation de résultats numériques.
Le chapitre 4 est celui qui se place au sommet de l’analyse. Nous étudions
la notion de test de résistance (stress-test) et mènons une reflexion sur les
hypothèses de modélisation qui la sous-tendent afin de bien interpréter les
résultats qui en seront issus. Une confrontation entre cette modélisation et
celle issue de la valorisation nous permet de bien voir toutes les différences
24
entre ces deux approches et de mettre en lumière leurs incompatibilités en
particulier les ordres de grandeurs. Nous clôturons ce chapitre et la thèse
par une analyse des résultats du stress-test EBA de 2016 en examinant en
particulier les banques françaises.
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Part I
Interest Rates Models for
Derivatives Pricing
Introduction
This preliminary chapter recalls the notions on quantitative modeling of in-
terest rates market and specially on derivatives pricing. In the spirit of
[Brigo], we expose different elements of interest rates modeling. In fact in
this chapter, we exclusively consider interest rate modeling in the framework
of derivative pricing. It is important to notice this point because the absence
of arbitrage opportunity framework that we study here is not the only way
to model interest rates. This no arbitrage pricing was introduced by Bache-
lier [1] in 1900 and developed by Black and Scholes [2] in 1973 for non linear
(payoff) products pricing. As it is perfectly adapted in pricing, it is not at all
the perfect tool for all type of financial problems. No arbitrage modeling just
takes as input market view and does not allow to inject into the model our
own predictions on market fluctuations as market view is the best prevision
because of the non arbitrage hypothesis.
There is a very large set of interest rates related products in the market and
if the client is interested by a very exotic payoff non available in the market,
the seller asks his structuration desk to create it. As our thesis focuses on
balance sheet of banks and financial institution, we can hope a priori that the
scope of products is more restrictive. Unfortunately it is not the case. If we
take a look at the Euro Medium Term Notes (EMTN) program of different
banks or financial institutions (these documents are public and available on
internet), we can notice the wide number of payoffs.
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We cannot give an exhaustive description of all interest rates market linked
products. We focus on the most common products starting from the most
basic to the most complex.
We briefly give the background to non arbitrage pricing models in inter-
est rates market as the following chapters of the thesis require a minimum
knowledge on this field. First of all, we present the different interest rates
linked derivatives. We begin by introducing the most common products
which are quoted on the market and which allows to extrapolate the price
of non quoted products. Then we focus on a special class of options: the
Bermuda and American options. This class of options is interesting because
of the wide use of them in balance sheet management of banks. We finish by
introducing structured debt products which are the funding instruments of
banks.
1 Basic Interest Rates Options: Caps, floors
and swaptions
These products are what we can call the benchmark products. They are the
most common products with very good quotation on market. Their extreme
liquidity permits to obtain very precise price or more exactly volatility. In-
deed, derivatives are quoted in terms of implied volatilities and not in terms
of prices. The implied volatility is nothing else than the quantity to inject
in the Black Scholes formula to obtain the price. On the implied volatil-
ity, Rebonato gives an interesting definition qualifying the implied volatility
by “wrong number which, plugged into the wrong formula, gives the right
answer.”[3]
As we said, two families of market are well quoted: cap/floor market and
swaption market. All the others more complex derivatives are embedded
in one of these two markets to get their prices. Derivatives pricing can be
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defined roughly speaking by an interpolation method based on the quoted
volatilities on caps, floors or swaptions market. Interpolation for non quoted
vanilla products (caps, floors and swaptions with strike, maturity or tenor
different from the strikes, maturities and tenors of the quoted products) is
done by injecting the characteristic of the considered product in the Black
Scholes formula. We now describe the three basic options: caps, floors and
swaptions.
1.1 Caps and Floors
A cap (respectively floor) is a payer (respectively receiver) interest rate swap
which has condition on each payment: for each payment date the exchange
is effective if the owner of the option receives more than he pays. The dis-
counted payoff of a cap is given by:
 X
i=↵+1
D (0, Ti)N⌧ (F (Ti 1;Ti 1, Ti) K)+
and those of floor is then given by:
 X
i=↵+1
D (0, Ti)N⌧ (K   F (Ti 1;Ti 1, Ti))+
where:
F (To;Ti 1, Ti): the forward rate fixed at Ti 1 and payed at Ti viewed at time
T
0
;
N : the nominal;
⌧ : the year fraction;
K: strike of the option;
D (0, Ti) : stochastic discount factor at time 0 for the maturity Ti.
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The cap (resp. floor) option can be decomposed on caplets (floorlets), which
can be priced independently of each other. This is a true advantage because
it means that we can price each caplet in the well adapted universe of prob-
ability. Each caplet then has its own numeraire (in other world benchmark
risk free asset).
Let us recall that the Black formula for a caplet expiring in T
1
and maturing
in T
2
is given by:
C
0
= ⌧P (0, T
2
)F (0;T
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2
) .N (d
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The analogous formula for the floorlet is given by
F
0
= ⌧P (0, T
2
) .K.N ( d
2
)  ⌧P (0, T
2
)F (0;T
1
, T
2
) .N ( d
1
) .
The best way to get intuitions on derivatives pricing is to focus on this
formula. Then we expose the demonstration of the formula from caplet in
what follows.
Proof of the Black formula for a cap
The objective is to value the price of the call option with a payoff given by:
(F (T
1
;T
1
, T
2
) K)+ .
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Let us define the forward rate
F (t;T
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2
) =
P (t,T1) P (t,T2)
T2 T1
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= ⌧
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1
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numeraire
.
The price of the call is given by the mathematical expectation of the dis-
counted payoff:
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with
0: valuation date;
T
1
: expiry date (reset date) of the forward rate;
T
2
: maturity date of the forward rate;
K: strike of the option;
P: historical probability;
ˆP: risk neutral probability;
Q: forward neutral probability associated with the numeraire P (0, T
2
);
⌧ : the year fraction;
P (i, j): the price at time i of a zero coupon giving 1€ at time j;
B (i): money market account at time i with by definition:
B (i) := B (0) exp
✓
 
Z i
0
rsds
◆
.
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To price our derivative, we have to associate a diffusion process to our forward
rate. The dynamic of our forward rate is directly related to the universe of
probability in which we perform the calculation. In the case of caplet pricing,
the adapted universe is the forward neutral probability universe with the
zero coupon bond numeraire. The numeraire is the risk free account that
we take as benchmark to value our derivative. The biggest advantage of
this numeraire is that at time of pricing it is not stochastic. As the money
account remuneration is not fixed ex ante, in the case of stochastic interest
rate modeling it makes the numeraire being stochastic. To eliminate this
stochastic characteristic of the numeraire, we consider the investment of our
cash in zero coupon with fixed earning contrary to the investment of the
money market account giving non determined earning. Passing from risk
neutral universe to forward neutral universe impacts the dynamic of the
discounted underlying as it has to be a martingale in the chosen universe.
In the forward neutral space, the dynamic of our forward rate is given by:
dF (t;T
1
, T
2
) =  .F (t;T
1
, T
2
) .dWt.
The Ito’s formula gives
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By integrating on both sides, we obtain:
Z T1
0
d ln (F (t;T
1
, T
2
)) =
Z T1
0
 dWt  
1
2
Z T1
0
 2dt
lnF (T
1
;T
1
, T
2
)  lnF (0;T
1
, T
2
) =
Z T1
0
 dWt  
1
2
Z T1
0
 2dt
ln
F (T
1
;T
1
, T
2
)
F (0;T
1
, T
2
)
=
Z T1
0
 dWt  
1
2
Z T1
0
 2dt
F (T
1
;T
1
, T
2
)
F (0;T
1
, T
2
)
= exp
✓Z T1
0
 dWt  
1
2
Z T1
0
 2dt
◆
F (T
1
;T
1
, T
2
) = F (0;T
1
, T
2
) . exp
✓Z T1
0
 dWt  
1
2
Z T1
0
 2dt
◆
.
If we go back to the price of our option, we get:
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Let us introduce the probability ˆQ equivalent to Q defined by:
dˆQ
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.
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We have by definition:
EQ (1✏ZT1) = ˆQ (✏) .
The value of the option is then:
C
0
= F (0;T
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, T
2
) .ˆQ (✏) K.Q (✏) .
By Girsanov theorem, the process ˆW defined by ˆWt := Wt  t is a Brownian
motion under ˆQ
We then have:
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with WT1p
T1
and
ˆW
T1p
T1
following respectively Gaussian laws N (0, 1) under Q and
ˆQ. The price of the option is rewritten, including the discount factor and the
year fraction, by:
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which concludes our proof for the price of a caplet option. The floorlet option
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formula is obtained with the same logic.
1.2 Swaptions
The swaptions are the second category of basic options on interest rates.
These options give the right to enter into a payer or receiver interest rates
swap at a future date (the maturity date of the swaption). The length of
this underlying swap is called the tenor of the swaption. Compared to a cap
option, the swaption can not be decomposed on different “one flow” options.
The decision of exercising the option is taken at the maturity date and then
we get the underlying on portfolio. The option depends then on a multitude
of forward rates.
First we expose the discounted payoff of a payer swaption:
ND (0, T↵)
 X
i=↵+1
(P (T↵, Ti) ⌧ (F (T↵;Ti 1, Ti) K))+
which can be rewritten in function of the forward swap rate by:
ND (0, T↵) (S↵,  (T↵) K)+
 X
i=↵+1
⌧P (T↵, Ti)
where:
S↵,  (To) ⌘
P (T
0
, T↵)  P (T0, T )P 
i=↵+1 ⌧P (T↵, Ti)
.
The market prices this option with a Black formula based on swap rate and
not forward rates. The numeraire under which the forward swap rate S↵,  is a
martingale is
P 
i=↵+1 ⌧P (0, Ti). This numeraire corresponds to a portfolio of
zero coupon bonds maturing at the different payment dates of the underlying
swap.
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As proved by Brigo, the expectation of this discounted payoff is given by:
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The market formula for this payoff is given by:
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The proof of this formula is done exactly with the same logic as in the caplet
formula.
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2 Bermudan / American Swaptions
Bermuda options related products are very frequent. The market uses them
to structure different debt products as they offer to the holder the possibility
to unload his commitment.
A Bermuda swaption is similar to a (European) swaption. Unlike European
swaptions, Bermuda swaptions have multiple execution dates and not only
one. The American options can be exercised at any time between two dates.
The American option is approximated by a Bermuda swaption with multiple
and close execution dates. The multiple execution dates characteristic adds
complexity in the pricing of the product. Indeed, the presence of multiple
exercise dates brings an optimal control problem in the pricing process.
ut0 = sup
⌧2=
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
h⌧
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|Ft0
 
,
8
<
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uT =
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t
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ut
i+1 |Fti
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with
ut: the value of the option at time t;
Bt: the numeraire associated to the measure Q;
ht: payoff from exercise at time t;
⌧ : stopping time taking value in a finite set = = {t
1
, t
2
, . . . , T}.
The whole process of the pricing is described in Chapter 3. We present here
the Libor Market Model, model which we use to price Bermuda options in
this thesis.
The Libor Market Model is based on the modeling of the forward Libor
rate and not the forward swap rate as in the case of European swaption
pricing. Basing the pricing of a swaptions related product on a modeling
built on forward rates forces us to link the swaptions volatilities (as the
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swaption market is quoted in terms of swaptions volatilities) to forward rates
volatilities (needed in the dynamics of forward rates). The link is done by
the well known Rebonato-Hull-White formula given by:
⇣
#LMMT
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.
We can precise that:
⇢i,j is the correlation between the non predictable parts (brownian parts) of
the forward rates i and j;
#LMMT
↵
,T
 
is the quoted volatility for the swaption maturing at T↵ and with tenor
T    T↵;
 i,t is the volatility of the forward rate i at the time step t (we make the
assumption of a piecewise constant volatility structure).
This step allows to pass from a triangular swaption volatilities matrix (see
Table 1) to a forward rates volatilities matrix (see Table 2):
Once the LMM volatility are calibrated to the swaption matrix through a
classical cascade calibration, we can use the dynamic of the different underly-
ing forward rates to simulate our payoff. The dynamics of the forward rates
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Table I.1: swaption volatilities
maturity/ tenor 1 year 2 years 3 years ... 10 years
1 year #
1,2 #1,3 #1,4 ... #1,11
2 years #
2,3 #2,4 #2,5 ... -
... ... ... ... ... ...
9 years #
9,10 #9,11 - ... ...
10 years #
10,11 - - ... -
Table I.2: forward rates volatilities
rates/ t 2 ]0, T
0
] ]T
0
, T
1
] ]T
1
, T
2
] ... ]T
8
, T
9
]
F
1
(t)  
1,1 dead dead ... dead
F
2
(t)  
2,1  2,2 dead ... dead
... ... ... ... ... ...
F
10
(t)  
10,1  10,2  10,3 ...  10,10
are given in LMM by:
dFk (t) =  k (t)Fk (t)
kX
j= (t)
⌧j⇢j,k j (t)Fj (t)
1 + ⌧jFj (t)
dt+  k (t)Fk (t) dZk (t)
and the numeraire associated to the related spot LIBOR measure is given
by:
Bd (t) =
P
 
t, T (t) 1
 
Q (t) 1
j=0 P (Tj 1, Tj)
with
Fk (t) ⌘ F (t, k   1, k): the forward rate between k  1 and k view at time t;
 k (t): the volatility of Fk (t);
⇢j,k: the correlation between Fj and Fk;
⌧j: year fraction between j   1 and j;
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Zk: a standard Brownian motion;
P (t, T ): bond price at time t for the maturity T ;
  (t): the index of the first forward rate that has not expired by t.
The spot LIBOR numeraire is the benchmark portfolio which represents the
investment of our cash. We can recall that:
• In the Black model for cap/floor the investment of the cash is done on
a zero coupon bond maturing at the maturity date of the cap/floor
• In the Black model for swaption the investment of the cash is done on a
portfolio of zero coupon bonds corresponding to the different payment
dates of the swaption
In the LMM, it is common to choose the spot LIBOR numeraire which cor-
respond to a discretely rebalanced account where dates corresponds to our
discrete tenor dates. The investment of the cash is not resumed by a invest-
ment at the valuation date. Indeed, at each tenor date, we have to replace
our cash in a zero coupon bond fixed at the placement date and maturing
at the next tenor date. We roll our cash investment on zero coupon bond
at each tenor date. This numeraire is obviously not known at the valuation
date as it depends on forward starting (fixing) zero coupon bonds. We are
facing stochastic numeraire as in the case of the risk neutral numeraire but
into the space spanned by our discrete tenors.
3 Structured Debt Instruments
As exposed on previous section, derivatives are market instruments and can
be traded for trading or hedging purposes. In addition to these derivatives, we
have debt instruments. These debt instruments contrary to the derivatives
imply exchanges of nominal as it is the principal aim of these products:
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lending money. Debt instruments can be in the form of notes (market known
product with by example an ISIN number) or in the form of other financial
instruments.
The debt obligations can contain an embedded derivative component. Indeed
the interest payment attached to the obligation can be more complex than a
regular fixed or floating payment. These more complex payments are related
to derivative products: the embedded derivative. In the case of a bond with
embedded derivative component, we price the two elements separately.
The models presented in the previous sections are also useful to price debt
instruments when they are structured with embedded derivatives. We present
first derivatives but we can highlight the importance of structured bonds.
Indeed these instruments are the principal need of the banks as they have a
constant need to finance their activities. The derivatives are used to hedge
their position in bonds. It is a way to change the nature of the payments
(fixed to float, float to fixed, structured to fixed,...) generated by our bond.
An additional purpose on the pricing of debt instruments are the credit/liquidity
risk. As these instruments include a payment of the nominal at the maturity,
the owner of the bond is exposed to a non-negligible default risk. We have
to include this risk in the pricing of our bond. A natural way is to change
the risk free rate by a risky rate taking account of the risk attached to the
issuer of the bond.
The presence of default/liquidity risk only on the bond causes an asymmetry
on the prices of asset and swap. More particularly, the execution of the
option is also impacted by this asymmetry component. Indeed, we have a
link between the execution of the swap’s option and bond’s option. Consider
the example of a bank which has a cancelable bond (ie embedded swaption)
and hedges this bond cash flow with a swap which can be canceled by the
counterpart. It is well known that swaptions are implicit options contrary to
caps/floors. The exercise of the caps and floors is automatic and does not
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need a special act from the option owner. The execution of swaption is not
automatic and the owner of the option must signal his intention to execute.
Thus, the exersice of this implicit option can depend on the intention of
the owner. If we return to our example, the bank does not have interest
to keep an open position (a bond without its hedge instrument). In other
world, if the owner of the swaption on the swap exercises the option, the
bank would exercise the option on the bond even if the payoff of the bond’s
option is not positive (because of the asymmetry). Given this specificity, the
open question is: how the bank must price this bond option? It can price
as an isolated product and take account of only the payoff of the option on
bond. An alternative choice is to price this option by taking account of the
execution zone of the swap’s option and not of the bond’s option, as the
execution of the swap’s option implies the execution of the bond’s option.
The second modeling adds asymmetry on the pricing function of the option,
it changes the natural option’s price function:P.1P by P1 ¯P
where:
P : the payoff of the bond’s option;
¯P : the payoff of the swap’s option.
The calculation of this type of price function is more complex than standard
function. A Monte Carlo method or change of variable technics can solve the
problem.
Pricing this funding instruments are more complex because in addition to
the pricing of the embedded option, we have to manage and incorporate
others properties as the credit risk and sub-optimal execution of the option.
All these specificities make the pricing of these products on pricing systems
more difficult than a more common Bermuda option.
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Part II
About long-term (cross-currency)
Bermuda swaption pricing
Abstract
This paper details first, from a computational point of view, the
pricing process of a Bermuda swaption and in a second stage a cross-
currency Bermuda. Our aim is to examine the lengthy process that
provides us a Bermuda swaption price with special attention to the
method of justifying the quality of our price.We only consider long-
term derivatives that lead to issues related to missing data and require
adjustment on the calibration. We also deal with the sensitivity of the
cross-currency swaption’s price to the choice of the modeling. The
standard model for pricing these kinds of options is a 3 factors hybrid
model (typically a 2 Libor Market Model + Black Scholes or 2 Hull-
White + Black Scholes). However we study the impact on the price of
each one of the stochastic factors. This study gives us an idea of the
relation between the cross-currency product and the volatility of each
one of the three markets involved (domestic, foreign and the FX)
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1 Introduction
Bermuda (or American) derivatives are among the most common exotic
derivatives. Even though they are common, their prices are not easily de-
termined. We do not have closed formulas for this class of product and
therefore we need to complete a lengthy pricing process. The difficulty of the
Bermuda option pricing comes from the determination of the optimal con-
trol problem’s solution, which is a crucial step for obtaining the price of this
product. We choose to work in the Libor Market Model (LMM) framework
to model the pricing problem. The Hull and White (HW) model would also
be an appropriate model but the LMM is more suitable for its compatibility
with the Black model which is the common market model for vanilla prod-
ucts. LMM is detailed by Brigo and Mercurio [4]. They also consider the
case of a Bermuda option pricing. The recent book by Guyon and Labordère
[5] devotes an entire chapter to Bermuda option pricing. They give a good
summary of an approach to the problem and also consider the dual problem
associated to the optimal control. The duality of the problem is indeed a
main element of the pricing if we want to give importance to the justification
of the price. The dual gap can also be considered as a metric for compar-
ing different methods/models and benchmarking their uncertainty. Andersen
and Broadie [1] propose a method to solve the dual problem and provide a
detailed algorithm for practical implementation. More generally, Bermuda
options pricing has been largely studied in the financial literature. For math-
ematical aspects, we can refer to Rogers [11] and Schweizer [12]. Recently
Borovykha, Pascuccia and Oosterlee [3] explore an extension for local levy
process. For numerical aspects, we can refer to Belomestny [2], Henrard [6]
[7] and Zhang, C.W. Oosterlee [13].
Grounding our current work in all of these references, we summarize the
pricing process of a Bermuda swaption. These part gives the necessary no-
tions for a good understanding of the next sections. We face a problem of
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interpolation on the tenor dimension of the quoted swaption matrix due to
the long-term properties of this product. This makes us revisit the Rect-
angular Cascade Calibration with the Endogenous Interpolation Algorithm
(RCCEIA) of Brigo and Mercurio [4]. We consider different hypotheses that
can be used to make an interpolation. After a back-testing phase, we keep
the hypothesis that provides the best results. This is the first contribution of
our paper. We then consider the pricing of a cross-currency Bermuda swap-
tion. We choose a hybrid three model to be the benchmark model. Our aim
is to understand the sensitivities of the product to the different volatilities
involved in the pricing. Thus, we can understand the importance of each
market in the value of the product.
Our aim is to test the accuracy of this model by considering each variable
one by one. The results of our tests allow us to understand the relationship
between this cross-currency derivative and each market. Finally, we note the
crucial place of the product’s margin in this sensitivity analysis.
Our work is organized as follows. We focus on the general framework of
Bermuda swaption pricing in the Section 2. In Section 3, we deal with the
problems that are specific to long-term property of the product. In particular,
it is this long-term property that makes us revisit the aspect of calibration,
taking account of the problem of missing data in swaption volatility for long
tenors. Finally, Section 4 presents the product and tests the relevance of
the three involved markets in the pricing of the cross-currency Bermuda
swaption.
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2 About Bermuda swaption pricing
2.1 The model
First of all, we need to choose a model in which we can perform the pric-
ing. The two most popular models in fixed income derivatives pricing are
the Hull-White model and the Libor Market Model. As stated in the intro-
duction, we choose the Libor Market Model. We consider the basic Libor
Market Model without including a stochastic model on the dynamic of the
volatility process (see Mercurio-Morini[10] and Labordère [8] for details on
this subject). Indeed, a deterministic volatility model is enough for Bermuda
options. Considering a stochastic volatility model will complicate the pricing
without capturing important market effect for this class of product. The
LMM gives the following dynamics to the forward Libor rates in the spot
Libor measure:
dFk (t) =  k (t)Fk (t)
kX
j= (t)
⌧j⇢j,k j (t)Fj (t)
1 + ⌧jFj (t)
dt+  k (t)Fk (t) dZk (t)
and the numeraire associated to this measure is given by
Bd (t) =
P
 
t, T (t) 1
 
Q (t) 1
j=0 P (Tj 1, Tj)
with
Fk (t) ⌘ F (t, k   1, k): the forward rate between k  1 and k view at time t;
 k (t): the volatility of Fk (t);
⇢j,k: the correlation between Fj and Fk;
⌧j: year fraction between j   1 and j;
Zk: a standard Brownian motion;
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P (t, T ): bond price at time t for the maturity T ;
  (t): the index of the first forward rate that has not expired by t.
For more details on the model (notations, hypothesis, proofs,..), we refer to
Brigo-Mercurio [4].
The Libor Market Model models all the forward rates one by one. For nu-
merical concerns, we can reduce the number of factors. In what follows, we
consider a one factor model, all the forward rates being driven by an unique
Brownian motion. In the case of Bermuda option, previous numerical tests
prove that adding factors does not affect the price of the option. This as-
sumption reveals that our option’s price is mainly impacted by level move of
the yield curve.
2.2 The calibration
Once the model chosen, we have to calibrate it to the data available in the
market. The market data is the swaption volatility matrix while the param-
eters of the Libor Market Model is forward rates instantaneous volatilities.
We assume that each rate has a volatility depending on the time. We make
the assumption for a piecewise-constant volatility because combining this as-
sumption with the Rebonato-Hull-White formula allows us to calibrate the
model analytically. We use a revisited version of the Rectangular Cascade
Calibration with the Endogenous Interpolation Algorithm of Brigo-Mercurio
[4]. We return to this calibration algorithm in the next section of our paper.
2.3 The Monte Carlo simulation
Now, we have to simulate the different forward rates involved in the payoff
function of our Bermuda swaption. The equations of our forward rates are
given by our model and the parameter’s values by the calibration. We choose
the Euler schema for the discretization of stochastic processes.
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The Libor Market Model is based on discrete tenors structure. Therefore to
price a product that does not have the same tenors structure than the quoted
products at the valuation day, we must apply a interpolation method. We
choose to apply the drift interpolation method described in Brigo-Mercurio
[4]. This method makes the interpolation in the Monte Carlo simulation.
Once the interpolated forward rates obtained, we can construct the numeraire
associated with the portfolio given by the rebalancement in the new tenor
structure.
2.4 The optimal control problem
2.4.1 The primal problem
The crucial step for providing our Bermuda swaption price is the resolution
of the optimal control problem. As mentioned in Anderson-Broadie [1], we
are facing the following optimization problem:
ut0 = sup
⌧2=
EQ

h⌧
B⌧
|Ft0
 
,
8
<
:
uT =
h
T
B
T
ut
i
= max
⇣
ht
i
, EQ
h
B
t
i
B
t
i+1
ut
i+1 |Fti
i⌘
with
ut: the value of the option at time t;
Bt: the numeraire associated to the measure Q;
ht: payoff from exercise at time t;
⌧ : stopping time taking value in a finite set = = {t
1
, t
2
, . . . , T}.
This primal problem can be solved by a Least-Squares Monte Carlo intro-
duced by Longstaff-Schwartz [9].
Once the different paths of the payoff are simulated by our previous step,
we can use the dynamic programming formulation (on the right side of the
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previous implication) to solve the problem. We “just” have to define an
exercising strategy. As suggested by Longstaff and Schwartz [9], we use
a regression on basis functions for the estimation. We first estimate the
exercising strategy (ie the coefficients of our regression) on learning paths
and use independent paths for the pricing.
The primal solution is low biased due to the sub-optimality of our exercising
strategy. We solve the problem numerically and obtain a maximum depend-
ing on the optimality of our exercising strategy, even if we converge to this
theoretical maximum when we increase the number of simulations and basis
functions. The solution is low biased. We need to solve the dual problem to
obtain an interval.
2.4.2 The dual problem
The dual problem is a minimization problem and gives a high biased estima-
tion of the price. We use the algorithm suggested by Anderson-Broadie [1]
and explained also by Guyon-Labordère [4] for solving this problem. The
logic behind this method is to use the super-martingale property of the
Bermuda swaption price process. As demonstrated in Anderson-Broadie [1],
the dual formulation of the problem is:
ut0 = inf
⇡2H
✓
⇡t0 + E
Q

max
t
i
2=
✓
ht
i
Bt
i
  ⇡t
i
◆
|Ft0
 ◆
.
We pass from a maximization problem in the space of stopping times to a
minimization problem in the space of martingales. By using the Doob-Meyer
decomposition, equalization ⇡t to the martingale part of our super-martingale
(theoretical price process) gives us a null dual gap. The computation of this
solution is “Monte Carlo in the Monte Carlo”. This solution requests a long
computational time. Anderson and Broadie [1] show also the proportional
link between the upper bound and lower bound. Our incertitude on the pri-
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mal problem is compensated by the incertitude on the dual problem. Finally,
we have non biased boundary for the expected solution.
2.5 The whole process
The following graphic resumes the pricing process for a Bermuda swaption.
It exposes the different data, methods, results and the coherence control. We
have two tests that help us to justify our price and alert us in case of error.
The first one is just after our Monte Carlo simulation. We calculate the Monte
Carlo implied volatility and compare it to the quoted implied volatility. This
control tests the coherence of our calibration and simulation. If we do not
have an abnormal spread between the MC and quoted volatility (the spread
is due to the Monte Carlo error and is converging to zero with the number
of paths), we can pass to the second test. This second test concerns the
the relevance of the optimal control solution. Usually the primal solution is
computed and used as the Bermuda swaption price but we have no indication
on the veracity of our estimation. The second test consists in computing the
upper bound and therefore the dual gap. Even if we use the lower bound
(because of operational time constraint), the computation of the upper bound
can be perform in a second stage or less frequently to confirm the level of
incertitude of our price.
50
51
3 About long-term property
3.1 Calibration Algorithm
Brigo and Mercurio [4] suggest an analytical calibration with an endogenous
interpolation (called RCCAEI in the book). Making an endogenous inter-
polation is an important step. Swaption matrix has missing data due to
non-quoted products for certain maturities and tenors. We can to do the in-
terpolation (linear, functional,...) and calibrate our model or we can do the
interpolation within the calibration algorithm. Brigo and Mercurio [4] opted
for the second case due to the emergence of non-coherent (negative or com-
plex) volatility in the case of linear interpolation. The RCCAEI algorithm
makes endogenous interpolation for missing data only for the maturities.
This algorithm assumes that our swaption matrix has no missing columns.
This is indeed the case when we consider Bermuda swaption whose underly-
ing swaption has a final maturity date at most in 10 years. In our case, we are
pricing long-term products whose underlying may mature in 30 years. When
we take a look at the swaption matrix taking into consideration the long
tenors, we observe the multitude of missing volatilities for specific tenors.
We need to re-adapt the RCCAEI algorithm for interpolating endogenously,
even if it concerns a class of tenors.
The idea behind RCCAEI is to use the Rebonato-Hull-White formula:
v2↵,  '
1
T↵
 X
i,j=↵+1
w̄i (0) w̄i (0)Fi (0)Fj (0) ⇢i,j
S↵,  (0)
2
Z T
↵
0
 i (t)  j (t) dt,
w̄i (t) = wi (t) +
 X
h=↵+1
Fh (t)
@wh
@Fi
,
@wh
@Fi
=
wh (t) ⌧i
1 + ⌧iFi (t)
" P 
k=i ⌧k
Qk
j=↵+1
1
1+⌧
j
F
j
(t)P 
k=↵+1 ⌧k
Qk
j=↵+1
1
1+⌧
j
F
j
(t)
  1{h i}
#
,
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wi (t) =
⌧iP (t, Ti)P 
j=↵+1 ⌧jP (t, Tj)
.
Combining this approximation with a piecewise constant volatility approxi-
mation (for the integral part of the first equation), we can get an analytical
formula if and only if the swaption matrix has no missing data. When the
matrix has missing rows (the maturity dimension of the matrix), RCCAEI
solves the equation only for available data and makes a constant volatility
hypothesis. In this way, when data is not available, we extend the “piece” of
our piecewise constant volatility to keep an analytical calibration.
The solution of the problem is less obvious when we have missing columns.
We can follow the same idea as RCCAEI. When we have missing swaption
volatility, we solve the equation for the next swaption volatility available.
“Next” means the closest tenor and the closest maturity for which swaption
volatility is available. As we skip missing swaptions volatilities, we have
missing forward rates volatility for this missing maturities and tenors. We
keep the constant volatility hypothesis of RCCAEI to solve the problem for
missing maturities. We have now missing data depending on the tenors
between the last volatility for which we apply the algorithm and the current
swaption volatility.
We have to set an hypothesis for missing columns as the RCCAEI do for miss-
ing rows. First, we can consider a linear interpolation for missing columns.
This has the same disadvantage as interpolation row outside of the calibration
algorithm. It gives us non coherent volatility. Another solution is to con-
sider a homogeneity assumption (used also by Anderson-Broadie [1] for the
volatilities which depends on non-quoted products) (i.e.  i,k =  i 1,k 1). But
this assumption is not enough dynamic. We have a lot of missing columns
and this assumption makes our forward rates volatility constant on too much
entries because of its recursive property. We can keep the same “frozen” value
in too much loops. We need a dynamic interpolation for the columns as for
the rows. The intuitive solution is to equalize all the missing forward rates
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volatilities. This has the advantage to be dynamic but we lose the coherence
of the interpolation. It is not truly a natural assumption unlike RCCAEI.
More explicitly, RCCAEI makes an assumption of constancy of the volatility
of the forward rates, but it concerns interpolation for the volatility of the
same forward rate. It just extends the interval where the volatility is con-
stant. When we make the assumption that all the missing forward volatilities
are constant, we equalize volatilities of different rates on different time hori-
zons. We make a dynamic calibration and this has the advantage to limit
the emergence of non-coherent volatility. But we not give an economically
interpretable hypothesis.
An important point is the emergence of non-coherent instantaneous forward
rates volatility. We have the same problem of complex/negative volatility
regardless the choice of the interpolation technique. We solve this problem
through a change of value of the quoted swaption volatility. If we are in case
of non-coherent volatility (i.e. the C quantity in the algorithm is positive),
we change the value of the quoted swaption by calculating the nearest value
to the quoted value that makes the volatility coherent (ie the C quantity
negative). This makes a change in the quoted swaption volatility. We can
consider this method as a smoothing method according the interpolation hy-
pothesis we adopt. We can choose these criteria for analyzing the quality of
our interpolation compared to the observation. Additionally, we minimize
the spread between the original quoted swaption volatility and the adjusted
swaption volatility. Our interpolation method is consistent with the observa-
tions. We define the distance between the two matrices by the L
1
distance for
the quoted and calibrated volatility (we calibrate only the upper triangular
part of the matrix).
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Data: F forward rates, P discount factor, v swaption volatility, ⇢ correlation
Result:   forward rates volatility
K  missing rows of v;
H  missing columns of v;
s last column/row of v included in the calibration;
a 1;
while (a  s) do
if a 2 K then
   a;
a min {i 2 Z : a < i  s, i /2 K}
else
   a
end
b a+ 1;
while (b  s+ 1) do
if b  a 2 H then
   b;
b min {i 2 Z : b  a < i  s, i /2 H}+ a
else
   b
end
w̄ [a+ 1 : b] CalculateW (F, P, a, b)
if   /2 K then
if     a /2 H then
  [b  1 : a] solveA (w̄, F, ⇢, , a, b,  ,  )
else
if b > s+ 1 then
for i =   : s+ 1 do
for j =   : a do
  [i : j]   [max (1, i  2) ,max (1, j   1)]
end
end
else
  [  : b  1, a] solveB (w̄, F, ⇢, , a, b,  ,  )
end
end
else
if     a /2 H then
  [b  1,   : a] solveC (w̄, F, ⇢, , a, b,  ,  )
else
  [  : b  1,   : a] solveD (w̄, F, ⇢, , a, b,  ,  )
end
end
b b+ 1
end
a a+ 1
end
for i = 1 : size (K) do
  [K [i] ,K [i]] =   [K [i]  1,K [i]  1] ;
p 1;
while K [i] + p 2 K do
  [K [i] + p,K [i]] =   [K [i] + p  1,K [i]  1] ;
p p+ 1
end
end
Algorithm 1: Calibration
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Data: F , P , a, b
Result: w̄
w [a+ 1 : b] P [a+1:b]P
b
j=a+1 P [j]
;
for i = a+ 1 : b do
for h = a+ 1 : b do
dw[i, h] w[i]
1+F [h]
 P
b
k=h
Q
k
j=a+1
1
1+F [j]P
b
k=a+1
Q
k
j=a+1
1
1+F [j]
  1{i h}
 
end
end
for h = a+ 1 : b do
w̄ [h] w [h] +
Pb
i=a+1 F [i] dw [i, h]
end
Algorithm 2: CalculateW
Data: w̄, F , ⇢,  , a, b,  ,  
Result:  
A w̄2bF 2b ;
B  2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj j 1,a⇢b 1,j 1;
C  w̄2bF 2b
Pa 1
h=1  
2
b 1,h + 2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
Pa 1
h=1  b 1,h j 1,h +Pb 1
i,j=a+1 wiwjFiFj⇢i 1,j 1
Pa
h=1  i 1,h j 1,h   aS2v2a,b a;
if C > 0 then
va,b a  
q
C+aS2v[a,b a]2
aS2
+ ✏;
Re-Calculate C
end
  [b  1, a]  B+
p
B2 4AC
2A
Algorithm 3: SolveA
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Data: w̄, F , ⇢,  , a, b,  ,  
Result:  
A w̄2bF 2b + 2
Pb 1
j=  w̄bw̄jFbFj +
Pb 1
i= 
Pb 1
j=  w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1;
B  2
P  1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj j 1,a⇢b 1,j 1 +Pb 1
i= 
P  1
j=a+1 w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1 j 1,a +
P  1
i=a+1
Pb 1
j=  w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1 i 1,a;
C  w̄2bF 2b
Pa 1
h=1  
2
b 1,h + 2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
Pa 1
h=1  b 1,h j 1,h +Pb 1
i,j=a+1 wiwjFiFj⇢i 1,j 1
Pa 1
h=1  i 1,h j 1,h +P  1
i,j=a+1 w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1 i 1,a j 1,a   aS2v2a,b a;
if C > 0 then
va,b a  
q
C+aS2v[a,b a]2
aS2
+ ✏;
Re-Calculate C
end
  [  : b  1, a]  B+
p
B2 4AC
2A
Algorithm 4: SolveB
Data: w̄, F , ⇢,  , a, b,  ,  
Result:  
A (a    + 1)w̄2bF 2b ;
B  
2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj j 1,a⇢b 1,j 1 + 2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
Pa 1
h=   j 1,h;
C  w̄2bF 2b
P  1
h=1  
2
b 1,h + 2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
P  1
h=1  b 1,h j 1,h +Pb 1
i,j=a+1 wiwjFiFj⇢i 1,j 1
Pa
h=1  i 1,h j 1,h   aS2v2a,b a;
if C > 0 then
va,b a  
q
C+aS2v[a,b a]2
aS2
+ ✏;
Re-Calculate C
end
  [b  1,   : a]  B+
p
B2 4AC
2A
Algorithm 5: SolveC
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Data: w̄, F , ⇢,  , a, b,  ,  
Result:  
A (a    + 1)w̄2bF 2b + 2
Pb 1
j=  w̄bw̄jFbFj +
Pb 1
i= 
Pb 1
j=  w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1;
B  
2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj j 1,a⇢b 1,j 1 +
Pb 1
i= 
P  1
j=a+1 w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1 j 1,a +P  1
i=a+1
Pb 1
j=  w̄iw̄jFiFj⇢i 1,j 1 i 1,a +
2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
Pa 1
h=   j 1,h;
C  w̄2bF 2b
P  1
h=1  
2
b 1,h + 2
Pb 1
j=a+1 w̄bw̄jFbFj⇢b 1,j 1
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Algorithm 6: SolveD
3.2 Numerical Results
We test our interpolation method in the calibration algorithm (Interpolation
1) by benchmarking it with the basic linear interpolation for missing columns
(Interpolation 0). We do our back-test from January 2014 to December 2014
with monthly intervals for LIBOR derivatives. We define our mispricing by
the RSS (residual sum of squares) between the original swaption volatility
matrix quoted in the market and the swaption volatility matrix obtained by
our calibration method with the adjustment to keep coherent forward rates
volatilities. Figure II.1 and Figure II.2 resume these results.
We see clearly the improvement made by Interpolation 1. We have a better fit
to the observed prices. However, we can note that our method doe not give us
a perfect fit to the input data. This can be justified by two remarks. First, our
endogenous interpolation is not necessarily an optimal interpolation method
even if it combines an easy and analytical implementation with “not too bad”
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Figure II.1: RSS between the theoretical and market volatility for LIBOR
swaption market
results. The second point is that the mispricing mays come from liquidity in
the swaption matrix, specially for high tenors and maturities. Indeed, we can
notice that non coherent volatilities and related adjustment come specially
with the less liquid swaptions.
We can ask our-self about the impact of these differences in term of prices. We
consider a 30Ync2Y+1Y, a 30 years final maturity Bermuda swaption callable
every year after 2 years traded the 01/31/2014. The fixed rate is equal to
4% and the nominal is accreting with this same rate. The initial nominal is
40MM$ and the final nominal is 129 735 900.40$. We price this product with
the volatility issued by Interpolation 0 and Interpolation 1. We keep the same
path for the innovation part to isolate the impact of the change in volatility
without the effect of the Monte Carlo error. We can remark that we choose
a fixed rate OTM and this makes the optimal stop arrives more frequently in
the first years. If we notice that the impacted swaption volatilities have long
maturities, we can partially explain the relatively low impact on our pricing.
It can differ if we consider an ITM fixed rate. Additionally we executed
in early periods and less we are correlated to long maturity volatility (most
affected volatilities in our calibration). To visualize the empirical distribution
of the optimal stopping time, we can take a look to the Figure II.3 which
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Figure II.2: Price impact for interpolation methods
Price Interpolation 0 Price Interpolation 1 Differences in bps
01/31/2014 22.19% 22.15% 4
02/28/2014 22.74% 22.75% -1
03/31/2014 23.69% 23.68% 1
04/30/2014 24.83% 24.86% -3
05/30/2014 28.24% 28.28% -4
06/30/2014 27.51% 27.55% -4
07/31/2014 27.07% 27.11% -4
08/29/2014 33.80% 33.86% -6
09/30/2014 30.27% 30.28% -1
10/31/2014 34.04% 34.00% 4
11/28/2014 38.61% 38.56% 5
12/31/2014 46.51% 46.47% 4
represents the empirical distribution for the 12/31/2014. We omit the final
date which corresponds to the default stopping time if there is no execution
before this last date.
We test the 05/30/2014 (date for which we have the biggest spread between
Interpolation 0 et Interpolation 1 price). For more clear results, we price
a non accreting Bermuda swaption which permits us to compare to have
comparable price as the nominal final nominal is the same in all cases. We
calculate this spread for different spread. Figure II.4 exposes the different
prices and the relative spreads.
We can conclude that the spread depends heavily on the rate which affects
the optimal stopping time empirical distribution. Nevertheless, the spread
between these two methods is quite small in term of option prices.
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Figure II.3: Empirical distribution of the optimal stopping time for the 4%
fixed rate swaption
Figure II.4: Percentage variation between Interpolation 0 and Interpolation
1
fixed rate percentage of variation
1.8% -1.15%
2.8% ('ATM) -0.17%
6% 0.00%
4 About cross-currency Bermuda swaption pric-
ing
4.1 The product
The concerned product is a Bermuda callable swap. This type of swap is
generally used for hedging a Bermuda callable bond. If the bond is issued
in a foreign currency, it can be hedged by a cross-currency Bermuda callable
swap to convert the risk to the domestic currency. Pricing a callable swap
can be resumed to the pricing of related swaption (with the relation callable
swap = swap +/- swaption, +/- depending on who gets the possibility of
canceling the swap).
Let us detail first the callable swap. The swap has an accreting nominal. The
swap begins with an exchange of initial domestic nominal versus initial foreign
61
nominal with the initial FX. It ends with the exchange of accreted domestic
nominal versus accreted foreign nominal. The accretion is defined initially by
a fixed rate. At the intermediate interest payment date, we have the exchange
of accretion for the domestic and foreign nominal at a fixed rate. We also have
an exchange of fixed foreign interest (the interest paid in the hedged bond)
paid annually versus a floating domestic interest paid semi-annually. We can
note that the fixed foreign interest payment is the opposite of the accretion
of foreign nominal. These two series of cash-flow cancel each other. This
swap is cancelable at any fixed interest payment date (so here annually). As
mentioned above, this callable swap can be represented by a swap without
cancellation option and a swaption whose underling swap’s cash-flows are
the opposite of the initial swap. Thus activating the swaption allows to enter
in a swap that cancels the existing swap in portfolio. The initial swap is
cancelable at different dates, therefore the swaption is Bermudan. We have
a series of underlying swaps whose length is depending on the date of call.
Now we can examine the cash-flows of the underlying swaps. When we
decide to exercise the swaption, we enter in a swap that totally cancels the
cash-flows in the initial swap. When the initial swap is canceled, we have
an early redemption for the domestic and foreign nominal. Therefore the
underlying swap has a exchange of current nominal at the call date. For all
following payment dates, the underlying swap has domestic fixed and floating
rate payment (in opposite direction of the initial swap’s cash-flows). At the
maturity of the contract the underlying swap has a exchange of final domestic
and foreign nominal.
Now, for more precise analysis (for the direction of the cash-flows), we con-
sider an issuer of the bond who takes engagement in a swap for hedging this
bond. We have the option of early canceling on the bond and therefore we
sell the early canceling option on the swap to our counterpart. The counter-
part have a cancelable swap that pays the floating domestic rate and receives
the fixed domestic rate at interest payment dates. At the final maturity date
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(if no early cancellation), it pays domestic final nominal and receives the for-
eign final nominal. More precisely, he has a swaption with underlying swap
pays fixed domestic rate and receives the floating domestic rate at interest
payment dates. At the call date, the underlying swap pays the the domestic
current nominal and receives the foreign current nominal (early redemption
cash-flows). Finally, at the maturity date, it pays the foreign final nominal
and receives the domestic final nominal (cancellation of the final redemption
of the initial swap).
As noticed by Piterbarg and Andersen, we simplify all the cash-flows in
domestic currency. Indeed, if we consider only these domestic cash-flows,
we have (1) an exchange of interest payments (payments of fixed rate and
receptions of floating rate) summed up by an accreting swap receiving floating
rate; (2) an exchange of nominal (payment of call date nominal and reception
of final date nominal) resumed, according to the formula of Piterbarg and
Andersen, by an accreting swap receiving fixed rate. The sum of these two
swaps is equal to zero. In the hypothesis of absence of spread on the domestic
floating rate leg, the option is not a cross-currency option. It can be resumed
by an accreting swaption in foreign currency.
Nevertheless, usually the product has spread on these legs. The presence
of spread gives to the option the cross-currency property. After defining the
model used for the pricing in the next subsection, we numerically analyze how
this spread affects the sensitivities of the product to the domestic option and
FX option market.
4.2 The model
The product that we investigate depends on three variables: the domestic
interest rate curve, the foreign interest rate curve and the FX rate between
these two currencies. The standard model for pricing this kind of product is
an hybrid model combining three distinct models. Generally, a combination
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of 2 Libor Market Model and 1 Black-Scholes is proposed. We use the Libor
Market Model described in the previous section to model the domestic and
foreign forward rates. We use the foreign currency as the pivot currency. We
convert all the cash-flows in the foreign currency. We use the foreign spot
LIBOR measure as numeraire, implying the appearance of a quanto term in
the dynamic of domestic forward rates. We use a Black-Scholes model for the
evolution of the FX rate. We have to take care of the drift term of the FX
rate dynamic which depends on the simulations of the domestic and foreign
forward rates. The formula in the Monte-Carlo is given by (we separate the
case t = 0 and t > 0):
lnF  (1) = lnF  (0) + ln
✓
1 + F f (1) s
1 + F d (1) s
◆
 s   
F
 
(s)2
2
 s
+ F  (s) (Wk (t+ s) Wk (t)) ,
lnF  (t+ t) = lnF  (t) + ln
✓
1 + F f (t, t, t+ 1)
1 + F d (t, t, t+ 1)
◆
 t   
F
 
(t)2
2
 t
+ F  (t) (Wk (t+ t) Wk (t)) .
For the domestic forward rates, the quanto adjustment changes the classic
LMM formula by:
dF dk (t) =  k (t)F
d
k (t)
0
@
kX
j= (t)
⌧j⇢j,k j (t)F
d
j (t)
1 + ⌧jF dj (t)
   F  (t)
1
A dt+ k (t)F dk (t) dZk (t) .
The remaining term (Libor Market Model dynamic for the foreign forward
rates and numeraire) is unchanged.
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Figure II.5: Spread Curves
4.3 Numerical Results
We consider a 30Ync2Y+1Y, a 30 years final maturity Bermuda swaption
callable every year after 2 years traded the 01/31/2014. As in the first part,
we choose a fixed rate (which is also the accretion rate of nominal) of 4%.
We fix the dollar denominated nominal to 40MM$. The initial fixing of the
FX rate is 1.3488 (fixing of the trade date). The corresponding initial euro
denominated nominal is 29 655 990.51€. These two nominal are accreting
and reach respectively 129 735 900.40$ and 96 186 165.78€ at the final ma-
turity date. We consider two cases. In the first case, we assume a standard
spread curve (as for a sovereign bond). In the second case, we consider that
the issuer fixes a penalty spread in the the hedge swap after a certain year
(it can be considered as a sanction price). It can happen that the issuer
is not interested by a long maturity issuance. Typically, we will consider a
negative spread in the twenty last years, which means that our issuer was
not interested to issue for a bond longer than 10 years. We treat these two
cases because of the importance of the spread curve in the emergence of the
cross currency property.
We price our two swaptions monthly for the whole 2014 years with the bench-
mark two Libor Market Model + Black-Scholes hybrid model. Our preceding
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Table II.1: Pricing of the standard spread swaption
3 factors model determinist € determinist FX LMM USD
01/31/2014 18.10% 19.37% 18.81% 19.70%
02/28/2014 18.39% 19.64% 19.00% 19.90%
03/31/2014 18.81% 20.01% 19.12% 20.55%
04/30/2014 20.05% 21.34% 20.79% 21.72%
05/30/2014 22.93% 24.11% 23.65% 24.46%
06/30/2014 22.11% 23.36% 22.70% 23.58%
07/31/2014 21.27% 22.41% 21.87% 22.76%
08/29/2014 27.48% 28.77% 28.12% 29.06%
09/30/2014 24.14% 25.20% 24.62% 25.41%
10/31/2014 28.32% 29.49% 28.90% 29.79%
11/28/2014 32.62% 33.61% 32.94% 33.74%
12/31/2014 40.60% 41.67% 41.01% 41.49%
sub-section tells us the importance of the USD volatility market. For mea-
suring the impact of the other markets (the EUR volatility market and the
foreign exchange volatility market), we choose to price with two factors model
excluding first the stochastic modeling of the EUR forward rates and after
the FX rate. We also price with a unique LMM for the USD forward rates.
All these tests inform us about the relative importance of the EUR market
and FX market coming from the spread. We use 5000 paths for the learning
sample and 30 000 paths for the pricing sample. To eliminate the Monte
Carlo error incertitude, we use the same paths in the four models.
We can observe that the EUR volatility market has a bigger impact than FX
volatility impact on the price of the swaption in the two cases. In the first
case (with no penalty), we can compare the magnitude of the impact level as
shown in the Figure II.8 representing contribution. This Figure divides the
impact of the passage of a three factor hybrid model to a Libor Market Model,
the blue (respectively the green) level represents the percentage accorded to
EUR volatility in the normal case (respectively in the penalty case) and the
remaining is due to the FX level. In the case of penalty spread, the impact of
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Table II.2: Pricing of the penalty spread swaption
3 factors model determinist € determinist FX LMM USD
01/31/2014 24.22% 23.73% 24.22% 23.75%
02/28/2014 24.58% 23.80% 24.56% 23.81%
03/31/2014 25.16% 24.73% 25.08% 24.69%
04/30/2014 27.09% 26.49% 27.07% 26.58%
05/30/2014 30.26% 29.43% 30.22% 29.46%
06/30/2014 29.08% 28.62% 29.05% 28.63%
07/31/2014 28.89% 28.45% 28.85% 28.53%
08/29/2014 36.24% 35.81% 36.21% 35.71%
09/30/2014 31.87% 31.33% 31.82% 31.82%
10/31/2014 35.39% 35.89% 36.33% 35.95%
11/28/2014 41.54% 40.89% 41.46% 40.77%
12/31/2014 49.88% 49.22% 49.83% 49.28%
Figure II.6: Prices in the standard case
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Figure II.7: Prices in the penalty case
Figure II.8: Percentage of the contribution coming from EUR volatility mar-
ket on the global impact
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the FX volatility is almost null. On the other side, the impact of volatility of
the EUR forward rates keep the same direction but with a smaller magnitude
compared to the first case.
As expected in the case of a penalty spread curve, pricing with a hybrid
model and pricing with an USD LMM is quite similar (cf Figure II.6). With
a normal spread curve, the LMM model is overestimating the price of our
Bermuda swaption as shown in the Figure II.6.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, after resuming the pricing process of Bermuda swaption, we
focus on the two important properties of a long term cross-currency product.
We propose an endogenous interpolation in the direct calibration algorithm
based on Hull White Rebonato formula as done in Brigo-Mercurio [4] but
we also include the interpolation for the missing tenors. This method is
compared to the basic exogenous linear interpolation. Even if we lose the
economic intuitive property in the interpolation hypothesis, we observe that
our method gives better results when we examine the difference between
theoretical price and market price. We also keep the advantage to have an
analytical algorithm.
In the second part, we note that our product is cross-currency only because
we have a spread on the floating domestic leg. A way of analyzing the relative
importance of the dependance on the two supplementary volatility markets
induced by this spread curve is to examine the pricing of our product in
different models. The numerical results highlight the contribution of EUR
volatility market induced by the apparition of this spread curve. The contri-
bution of the FX volatility market is smaller than the EUR volatility market.
This contribution analysis is different from a standard sensitivity analysis.
With a sell side vision, we may be more interested by the sensitivity be-
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cause of the presence of a dynamic hedge portfolio adjusted frequently. In a
buy side vision, we may be more interested by how the determination of the
spread curve during the issuance of an asset swap will impact the dependance
of our product in the different volatility markets.
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Part III
Macro-Stressing the Pricing of
Bermuda Swaptions
Abstract
The aim of the paper is to analyze the possible evolutions of deriva-
tive products’ prices based on predictions of the different risk factors.
The projections of the risk factors are based on different macroeco-
nomic scenarios. Our work is split into three parts. First, we give the
different macroeconomic scenarios and the logic behind the construc-
tion of these previsions. In the second part, we project the implied
volatility in the different macroeconomic environments. As we have
a whole matrix of volatility to project with several entries, we com-
pare the Factor Model approach and Principal Component Analysis
to capture the information with a reduce number of variables. We use
Kalman filter method as a de-noising method and backtest our previ-
sions. Last part gives the results of the macro-stressing on a Bermuda
swaption. In this part, we also present a Uncertain Parameters Model
which takes account of the different macroeconomic scenarios and their
probabilities.
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Introduction
The price of a derivative product is calculated using basically the no arbitrage
assumption and the market quotation at the pricing date. For sell side, the
most accrual way to measure the risk exposure on this kind of product is to
calculate the Greeks. As the position on derivatives is hedged by a replication
portfolio the actual risk exposure is coming from the daily (or intra-day if
the hedge portfolio is rebalanced in intra-day) variations of the different risk
factors. If we consider a buy side institution, we do not have this replication
portfolio. The managers tack positions on the market because of the need of
their activities, for example investment or funding requirements. The activity
of the institution generates structural risk.
We can choose different modelings to analyze the risk exposure for a non
hedged position. If we take a look at how insurance companies model their
balance sheet risks for Solvency II, we find a “Monte Carlo on Monte Carlo
simulation”. The first Monte Carlo is performed in the real world when the
second is performed in the risk neutral world given the simulated real world
factors (rates, implied volatility cube). As a “Monte Carlo on a Monte Carlo”
is a time consuming method, least squared based method allows insurance
companies to reduce the computing time (cf Devineau and Loisel [6]).
We can split the modeling into two parts: one to measure the risk exposure
on market movement and another to obtain a price for an optional product.
The second model is a strong tool to obtain a price of an hedgeable option
given the hypothesis of the absence of arbitrage opportunity. As highlighted
by El Karoui, Loisel, Prigent and Vedani [7] using risk neutral modeling needs
strong hypothesis especially it needs the effective hedging by the holder which
is true only locally in time and space (i.e. each parameter must be calibrated
frequently and for a specific type of product). We discuss this point further in
the next chapter. The modeling of risk exposure is more subject to discussion.
As we have remarked, the insurance company bases its model on a real world
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Monte Carlo, which corresponds to the calibration of a process to historical
data. Another possible way to measure the risk exposure is to make future
estimations of possible evolutions with few scenarios. A standard method is
to use macroeconomic scenarios based on our economic visions. The readers
can find references that resume the approach for scenario planning in the
context of stress testing. We can mention BIS 2015 [2] as one of these papers.
Once we have selected the possible different macroeconomic environments,
we have to project the different variables according to these anticipations.
This model is more based on a forward looking vision as it is not repeating
the past (historical simulation) or repeating the parameter of the past (real
world Monte Carlo). In what follows, we choose this scenario based modeling
to project risk factors.
We expose the different macroeconomic scenarios and give the intuition on
the projection of the different macroeconomic and financial (included interest
rates) variables. We detail the projection of implied volatility. We suppose
that all the needed information on the considered macroeconomic scenario
is resumed by the projected interest rates. We have to project a high di-
mensional matrix with only few points of the interest curve. We use Factor
Model and Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to reduce the number of
variables. These methods are based on hidden variables. As the estimations
of hidden variables by the models are noisy, we used Kalman filter to clean
our observations. We backtest the previsions of our models and compare the
outcomes of models with and without the de-noising technique. The pric-
ing of our derivative product is performed in these different macroeconomic
scenarios. We consider these valuations as future possible evolutions of the
product based on our macroeconomic anticipations for the future. This dif-
ferent scenario-based prices give us the risk exposition on our portfolio. We
also analyze the sensitivity of our risk exposition to the number of chosen
factors in the projection of the implied volatility matrix.
We organize our work as follows. Section 1 is devoted to the different macroe-
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conomic scenarios. We explain which scenarios we choose and why. This
section also gives the general view on the projection method of the macroeco-
nomic and financial variables. In Section 2, we focus on the implied volatility
projection and the factor model. Finally, Section 3 gives the results of our
macro-projected pricing. We use these projections to obtain the risk expo-
sure of our product. We present the results resulting from the Uncertain
Parameters Model.
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1 Macroeconomic-Based Projections
We do the projections at the end of 2014 for the end of 2015. We consider
three scenarios in a “what if” scenarios optic. The choice of the number of
scenarios that we study is a central hypothesis. Three scenarios appear to
be a quite optimal number of scenarios. It is indeed usual to consider three
alternatives to make decision in finance. The number of scenarios in a stress-
testing context ranges between 2 and 4. To give detailed examples, the EBA
stress-test includes 2 scenarios (1 baseline, 1 adverse) and the recommenda-
tions for internal stress-testing are to take 4 scenarios (1 baseline, 2 adverses,
1 reverse). Considering more scenarios can make difficult the exploitation of
the results. Nevertheless, in a more specific field, banks can choose to study
more scenarios as it can be the case in asset and liability management where
the only variable of interest can be the net interest income.
As we have mentioned, we consider three scenarios and in these three scenar-
ios, we have baseline and adverse scenarios and all the scenarios have a non
negligible probability to appear. They are “best guess” estimations. We have
one central scenario which reflects the natural anticipations given today’s
(end of 2014) macroeconomic context. This scenario is the most likely case
for next year. The two alternative scenarios are deteriorated scenarios. We
consider the two most realistic scenarios with opposite effects on the interest
rates. These two scenarios are built on past historical scenarios. We detail
the three scenarios in what follows.
1.1 Descriptions of the scenarios
1.1.1 Central Scenario
This scenario is based on three structural hypothesis. First, we suppose a
fiscal consolidation in France, which affects the French growth but inverses
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the debt/GPD dynamic. The second hypothesis concerns the low level of
interest rates due to the economic policy. The last hypothesis is a decrease
in the savings rate of French households supporting consumption.
This scenario is characterized by a slow recovery: the production is affected
in level and growth rate. For the financial context, the low level of inflation
and the expansionist monetary policy conducted by the ECB will keep the
long rates low in France.
1.1.2 Deflation in the Eurozone Scenario
This scenario is based on the Japanese Deflation. This scenario highlights
the uncertainty of the recovery in GDP because of a negative confidence
represented by a rise in the household savings to rate and a shock of com-
petitiveness with a negative impact on the exports.
1.1.3 Bond Crash Scenario
Based on the bond crash of 1994, this scenario’s central hypothesis is a tight-
ening of US monetary policy faster than expected. This policy implies a rise
of US long interest rates and a contagion on the Eurozone. This scenario can
be resumed by three consequences:
• Slowdown;
• Rise of the long term interest rates;
• Drop of all classes of asset prices.
1.2 Projected Interest Rates Curve
Stress-testing interest rate risk supposes to project interest rate curve. Fi-
nancial literatures present many ways to project interest rate curve in the
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context of stress-testing. Abdymomunov and Gerlach [1] present different
methods and compare the impacts of the choice of the method in stress-
testing the economic value of equity of banks. Their paper highlights the
advantage of the Nelson Siegel model generator in a multi-scenarios frame-
work. Indeed, the proposed method calibrates a parametric curve at each
historical observation and combines the different parameters (which stand for
short term rate, slope and curvature) to generate hypothetic scenarios. They
generate a large set of scenarios and obtain impact for each one. As men-
tioned earlier, our approach is based on pure historical scenario. So we need
to generate interest rates curve for those already observed macroeconomic
shocks in a deterministic approach. The naive methods can consist to apply
historical change (in absolute or in relative) observed during the considered
period of crisis to current interest rates. As highlighted by Adbymomunov
and Gerlach [1], these naive methods have many drawbacks as negative for-
ward rates, non smooth yields curve or non economic meaning yield curve
given the current level of the yield curve. To obtain a more robust and eco-
nomic meaning projection of interest rate curve, we use a projection coming
from a Nelson Siegel Svensson Filipovic model. The shocks on the param-
eters of the parametric functional are applied to the parameters calibrated
for the current interest rate curve. These applied shocks are observed during
the considered period of historical crisis. These projected interest rate curve
is not estimated by the author and is taken as an exogenous input in the
following volatility projection model presented in this study. in the following
table, we resume the different approach for generating stress-testing.
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Few scenarios Many scenarios
Historical Deterministic: after selecting
of few crisis periods, we have to
apply the historical shocks to the
current level of interest rates and
credit spreads.
Method used in this chapter.
Deterministic: we choose a
large period of time and apply
all the observed shocks of this
large period to the current level
of interest rates and spreads.
Stochastic: we choose the main
variables of our modelling
(directly interest rates or
parameters of a Nelson-Siegel
parametrization) and calibrate
them to historical data. We can
simulate many scenarios with the
calibrated process.
Hypothetical Deterministic: we select risk
factors given the current
economic situation and deduce
the impact of this hypothetic
combination of risk factors on
the level of interest rates and
credit spreads (an intermediate
step can be the impacts of risk
factors on macroeconomics
variables which affects financial
variables).
Method used in the EBA
stress-test.
Deterministic: we calibrate at
each date of a large period the
parameters of a Nelson-Siegel (ie
the short term rate, the slope
and the curvature). We extract
the historical shocks on these
parameters which give us a range
of values for these three latent
variables. With a 3 dimensional
grid including different values of
the parameters in the defined
range, we can combine different
values of factors. It permits to
generate interest rates curve with
multiple shocks on short term
rate, slope and curvature which
were not observed in the past.
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Figure III.1: Interest Rates Projections
Figure III.1 illustrates the different interest rates curve compared to the
curve at the current date. As we can remark on Figure III.1, the obtained
curve scenarios are only parallel shift scenarios. The Central Scenario and
Bond Crash Scenario are parallel shocks up (with a really more important
amplitude for the Bond Crash Scenario) whereas the Deflation Scenario is a
parallel shock down. We can notice that we are not considering cap and floor
for the absolute value of the shocks. If we consider the level of the cap and the
floor of the Document of Basel Committee on Interest Rate Risk on Banking
Book [2], our scenarios are not affected by the cap of 500 basis points but
two (Central and Deflation) of our three scenarios are lower that the floor of
100 basis points. This can express the fact that our two stressed scenarios
are not enough stressed for a aim of calculating risk exposure and hedging
it. Our objective is little different. We are not trying to calculate extreme
risk exposure. We just have anticipations on the future with a significant
probability of appear and we want to anticipate the value of our derivative
products based on our intuition for the future macroeconomic context.
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2 Projecting Implied Volatility with Dimension
Reduction
A key risk factor to price a derivative is the implied volatility surface. As
our Bermuda swaption is based on the market of (European) swaptions, the
term “implied volatility” stands for swaptions implied volatility cube. The
implied volatility is nothing else than the quoted price of the swaptions in
term of volatility instead of price metric. In other words, it is the implied
volatility that we have to put in the Black formula to obtain the price of
the product. Market is quoted by implied volatility because it is the more
intuitive scale compared to price. In the risk neutral world, implied volatility
is the risk associated to the underlying as it represents its variability around
its estimated value. This implied volatility can be define as a measure for
analyzing market sentiment as highlighted by Kiesel and Rahe [10].
Our aim is to project the implied volatility, which is a key parameter of the
risk neutral modeling, using projections coming from real world (or physical
world). Christoffersen, Jacobs, Chang [4] and Kiesel and Rahe [10] analyze
the causality in the other direction. They use information from risk neutral
modeling (i.e. the implied volatility) to forecast the real world metrics as
asset returns.
As we qualify the implied volatility as the sentiment of the market partici-
pants, we can use this sentiment to add information to the historical informa-
tion to improve the predictions quality or we can use our anticipation on the
real world variables (typically macroeconomic variables) to estimate future
sentiment of market participant. In our study, we are clearly in this second
logic as the final objective is to obtain stressed derivatives prices, i.e. what
would be the sentiment of the derivative market participants in a stressed
macroeconomic environment.
First of all, we suppose that all the informations about the scenario is resumed
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by the interest rates. We use only the interest rate curve as predictor for
estimating the implied volatility surface. We use some representative points
of the interest rate curve: 2Y, 5Y, 10Y and 20Y points. Our swaption’s
implied volatility surface has 70 entries (10*10 minus 3*10 non quoted points)
and we have only 4 predictor variables. We can naively project all the entries
of our surface one by one. However we can image an important correlation
between all this entry of our volatility surface. To take account of this strong
link between the different volatility, we can use a Factor Model or a Principal
Component Analysis. More details on these two methods can be found in
[9] chapter 7. The aim of these models is to reduce the number of factors
of our swaption matrix. With the N factors model, we extract the N more
significant orthogonal variables/components for the whole matrix of data.
2.1 Factor Model
This model tries to explain p different variables in the dataset by m vari-
ables called factors, with of course m<p. The observed variables are linear
functions of the common factors plus an error term.
We have:
8i 2 {1, . . . , p} , xi =  i,1f1 + . . .+  i,mfm + ei;
where
(xi)i2{1,...,p} are the observed variables;
(fj)j2{1,...,m} the common factors;
( i,j)i2{1,...,p}⇥j2{1,...,m} the constant factor loadings;
(ei)i2{1,...,p} the error terms.
We can rewrite this relation in matrix form:
x = ⇤f + e.
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We impose that all factors and errors (fj)j2{1,...,m}, (ei)i2{1,...,p} are indepen-
dent, normally distributed variables with zero means and unit variances.
Then we have a multivariate normal distribution for the observed variables
x (we can subtract the empirical means to obtain zero mean variables). The
hypothesis of normality permits us to use the maximum likelihood estima-
tion. The form of the model can remember us a simple linear regression. But
when we look closer, we can observe that both ⇤ and f are unknown. We
can use the maximum likelihood estimation to determine:⇤, E (ee0) ⌘  and
in a second step we can estimate f with a regression.
We maximize the likelihood function of the sample by finding the optimal ⇤
and satisfying the following relation expressed in term of the covariance of
our variables x:
⌃ = ⇤⇤0 + .
We can point that this model fits the initial data by according a relative im-
portance on the off-diagonal elements of ⌃. It can be viewed as a correlation-
focused approach. It principal aim is to reproduce the inter-correlations
among variables.
2.2 Principal Component Analysis
This method is similar to factor model in the sense that it tries to resume
the information contained in a set of correlated variables with a set of uncor-
related variables. The new set of variables is a linear transformation of the
initial set of variables.
If we denote by x the initial set of the correlated variables, by t the new set of
uncorrelated variables and by w the loadings, we have the following relation:
t = xw.
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The new set of variables called the principal component is classed in decreas-
ing order of variance. An intuitive way for dimension reduction is to use the
truncated transformation issued by the use of the first L loadings.
tL = xwL.
Contrary to the factor model, the PCA is variance-based method. It focuses
the fitting on the diagonal term of ⌃.
2.3 Denoising the Hidden Variables by Kalman Filter
The Kalman Filter is a strong tool to predict, filtrate and smooth the state
(hidden) variables of a state-space representation. First of all, let us define
this representation:
for a given (yt) process which takes values in Rm and a related process (↵t)
taking values in Rn, we have:
(
yt = Mt↵t + dt +Qtut
↵t = Tt↵t 1 + ct +Rtvt
where we have the following deterministic parameters (which can be time
dependent or not):
Mt 2 Rm⇤n;
dt 2 Rm;
Qt 2 Rm⇤m;
Tt 2 Rn⇤n;
ct 2 Rn;
Rt 2 Rn⇤n;
and the two white noises:
ut 2 Rm;
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vt 2 Rn.
The PCA or FM models give an estimation of the observations of hidden
variable (↵t). We can deduce from the observations of (yt) and estimation of
(↵t) the different parameters of the state-space representation. As we have
mentioned previously, Kalman filter allows us to obtain:
• A filtrated value: ↵t|t ⌘ E (↵t | y1, . . . , yt) which corresponds to our
PCA or FM estimations that permit us to calibrate the parameters of
the state-space representation;
• A predicted value: ↵t|t 1 ⌘ E (↵t | y1, . . . , yt 1);
• A smoothed value: ↵t|T ⌘ E (↵t | y1, . . . , yT ).
Our de-noising method consists in taking the predicted value instead of the
filtrated value to estimate the factors. This method is based on the intuition
that the theoretical model prevision provides a better estimate compared to
the filtrated value.
2.4 The Projection Model
We assume that the swaption implied volatility is a function of the interest
rates. This hypothesis seems to be coherent, in other words it is equivalent
to assess that the uncertainty around the level depends on the level. Thus
we have:
 i,t = f
 
rj={2,5,10,20},t
 
.
We choose the 2Y, 5Y, 10Y and 20Y points of the interest rate curve to
resume the information on the yield curve moves. r stands for the interest
rates point,  i,t is the implied volatility i (corresponding to a pair of maturity
and tenor) at time t.
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As there are a lot of pairs i of maturity and tenor and only 5 points of interest
rate curve for a point in time, we use dimension reduction techniques.
In the PCA or Factor Model, we can write the volatility matrix as a linear
combination of factors and scores in matrix notation :
 
[1:I,1:T ] = a[1:I,1:I]score[1:I,1:T ].
As the factors are ordered by decreasing order of variance, we can set to 0
the factors after a rank n to eliminate the noise as the small variance scores
are considered as noise.
 
[1:I,1:T ] = a[1:I,1:n]score[1:n,1:T ].
As the I implied volatilities are resumed by n scores, we search to project
the n scores to obtain the projections of the I implied volatilities.
For each h 2 [1, n], we use linear regression to project the score. The PCA
and FM give us the history of scores and therefore a linear regression is
possible:
scoreh =  h.r.
We can thus project implied volatility by first projecting the scores using lin-
ear regression parameters and our projected interest rates r for the projected
date Tproj.
scoreh,T
proj
=  h.rT
proj
.
The Kalman Filter denoising can permit us to estimate a predicted score
instead of a filtrated score.
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2.5 Back-testing Methodology
To test the quality of our prediction, we back-test our projection model
with historical data. We choose a number of observations which constitutes
our learning sample, in which we perform PCA/FM and calibrate the linear
regression parameters linking the scores and the interest rates (using only
information available in the learning sample). Once the model calibrated, we
inject the realization of the interest rates for a certain horizon (1 year) on the
model to obtain an estimation of the implied volatility for this horizon. We
can compare this projection with the realized implied volatility. We perform
this procedure by shifting the time window of our learning sample.
2.6 Numerical Results
2.6.1 Resuming the data by reduced number of factors/components
In our paper, the initial set of correlated variables is the implied volatility
matrix entries, as we said the 70 “well” quoted implied volatilities. Figure
III.2 represents the correlation matrix of this 70 volatilities. The calculation
of the correlation is based on daily data from 01/01/2010 to 12/31/2014.
We choose a 5 years history because we have to get a wide spectrum of
realizations in our learning data encompassing the projected values of the
interest rates.
We can observe the high level of correlation between the different volatilities
The minimum correlation level is 68.10% and the average correlation for the
off-diagonal elements is 93.11%. This high level of correlation confirms our
initial intuition to use a dimension reduction technique. We plot the percent-
age variability explained by the different principal components in the Figure
III.3 after performing a PCA. It is obvious that the number of significant
principal components is quite small compared to the number of variables in
the initial set (ie 70).
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Figure III.2: Correlation of the quoted volatility
Figure III.3: Variability Explanation
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Figure III.4: Residuals of the PCA
In the following tests, we arbitrary choose four benchmark dimensions: 4,
10, 15 and 20.
In Figure III.4, we represent the historical average of the residuals for the 70
variables of the initial set. The residuals represent the absolute difference be-
tween the observations of variables and the reconstructed values of variables
with a PCA ofL factors.
We can also perform the same tests with the residuals when we use a Factor
Model.
We can also compare the two methods for the same level of dimension reduc-
tion. Figure III.6 shows the differences for a reduction to 4 dimensions.
2.6.2 Projecting the data in the different scenarios
Our preceding subsection permits us to obtain the different values of the
hidden factors and components. We apply a classical regression analysis on
our data. We regress the values of the selected number of factors/components
on the four points of our interest rate curve.
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Figure III.5: Residuals of the FM
Figure III.6: Residuals of the PCA and Factor Model with 4 factors
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Figure III.7: Volatility Projections
Then we can predict the value of principal factors/components for the sce-
nario based estimations of the interest curve. Once we have predicted the
factors/component for each anticipated scenario, we can obtain the projected
full volatility matrix with the 70 entries for each scenario. Figure III.7 il-
lustrates the three projected volatility matrices (the results are those of the
Factor Model with 4 factors). The hypothesis of parallel shifts of our interest
rate impacts the shocks on implied volatility. The difference between the
three implied volatility matrices are just explained by parallel shifts.
2.6.3 Back-testing of the prevision
We first focus on the average efficiency of our predictions and, to be able to
compare the different models, we consider the same period of time: 150 last
points of our back-testing which correspond to the period from June 2014 to
December 2014. We compare the calculated indicators for different inputs of
our model:
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Table III.1: 2 factors
Sample PCA PCA Kalman Factor Model Factor Model Kalman
900 63.57 63.65 63.44 63.75
800 64.70 64.86 64.54 64.90
600 61.02 62.92 60.85 62.68
400 59.03 61.12 59.03 61.27
300 62.36 61.52 61.33 59.79
Table III.2: 3 factors
Sample PCA PCA Kalman Factor Model Factor Model Kalman
900 60.66 59.69 60.66 60.78
800 62.57 62.23 62.47 62.67
600 58.57 60.32 58.64 60.65
400 56.34 58.56 56.97 59.29
300 57.32 62.83 57.90 58.09
• Number of factors: 2 to 5;
• Number of observations in the learning sample of PCA/ factor model
300, 400, 600, 800 and 900 observations;
• The method: PCA or factor model;
• Kalman filter de-noising method or not.
Here we calculate the quality of the prevision by the L2 distance between
the prevision given the realized interest rates and the realized volatility. The
following tables present the different results.
The 4 factors model gives best results except for PCA Kalman when the
number of observations is small (i.e. less than 600 observations).
Best results if we focus on the number of estimation dimension are obtained
for 400 observations both for the PCA and factor model.
For factor model, for all considered numbers of factors, the Kalman de-noising
method gives mostly less good results compared to the non-de-noised data.
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Table III.3: 4 factors
Sample PCA PCA Kalman Factor Model Factor Model Kalman
900 58.96 55.06 59.21 60.50
800 60.51 56.19 60.66 61.50
600 56.81 60.64 56.96 58.40
400 53.25 64.10 53.57 56.39
300 55.91 69.49 55.74 55.56
Table III.4: 5 factors
Sample PCA PCA Kalman Factor Model Factor Model Kalman
900 62.48 69.49 62.23 61.12
800 64.00 72.19 64.40 62.81
600 61.02 63.00 59.25 59.73
400 54.90 69.63 55.97 59.12
300 56.88 108.50 57.19 59.24
The results are not impacted by the chosen number of factors. The results
are quite different when de-noising is applied to PCA. The worst results com-
pared to non-denoised data are obtained for the 5 factors for all numbers of
observation (the indicators are degraded from 30% with Kalman filter pre-
diction). The Kalman de-noising method gives bad results for high numbers
of PCA with large components. The method gives better results for 3 and 4
components PCA and only when the number of observations are quite high
(900 – 800 on our data). The improvement on the predictability is large for
the 4 components PCA; our indicator is 7 % lower when data are de-noised
for 4 components PCA compared to 1% for the 3 components PCA given a
large number of observations (900 and 800). The method does not improve
the indicator for the 2 components PCA. We can resume by acting that the
de-noising method improves our prevision only locally when the number of
observations are quite large and for the most adapted numbers of components
(ie 4 and accessory 3).
For the optimal number of factors 4, if we consider numbers of observations
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Figure III.8: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
900 observations and 4 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
and de-noising method together with PCA, we notice inverse effects on our
prediction quality. As we have seen, the optimal number of observations is
400 points but the Kalman filter gives bad results for this number of obser-
vations. The positive effect of the de-noising method for 900 observations
does not offset the negative effect from passing from 400 to 900 observations.
It seems better to choose the optimal number of observation and to do not
apply de-noising method.
If we want to compare PCA and factor model, we notice that the two methods
give quite similar results without de-noising method (as we have seen, the
two methods react very differently to the Kalman de-noising). Even if the
results are close, the PCA gives better results than factor model (few basis
points better).
Let now go further for the 4 components/ factors model. We consider now
the time series of the backtesting composed by 150 points corresponding to a
900 observations based model. Figure III.8 draws the historical value of our
indicator.
We can notice that the de-noising method improves our predictions until
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Figure III.9: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
400 observations and 4 factors- from May 2014 to December 2014
September 2014 only. After, we have a quite similar result between the
method with Kalman Filter and without Kalman filter. If we draw the same
historical but with a PCA based on 400 observations, we obtain Figure III.9.
As we expect, the general improvement brought by the Kalman filter is less
than in the case of 900 observations based PCA. Nevertheless, we observe
that the same 2 distinct periods with different results stay. From May 2014 to
September 2014, the Kalman filter adds improvement to the model whereas
from September 2014 to end of 2014 we observe the contrary.
We draw the interest rates historic to try to understand why we have two
distinct time windows. Figure III.10 represents the 2 years point of the
interest rates curve and Figure III.11 represents the 20 years point.
We can observe that there is a real break on September as a change of regime,
a regime in which we observe a change of causality link between short term
and long term rates. We can deduce that the de-noising method is not
adapted to regime switching and gives low quality predictions after a regime
switch. This break in the time series is caused by the negative rates applied
by the ECB to banks funding.
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Figure III.10: Historical Evolution of 2Y point of Interest Rate Curve - from
May 2014 to December 2014
Figure III.11: Historical Evolution of 20Y point of Interest Rate Curve - from
May 2014 to December 2014
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Figure III.12: Historical Evolution of 2Y point of Interest Rate Curve - from
December 2010 to December 2014
To test the statement at another breaking point in time series, we have to go
back in our historical data. To do so, we consider the 300 points based PCA
which permits us to have a back-test for 750 points. We can notice that the
quality of our predictions provided by Kalman Filter method for 300 points
based on PCA is degraded compared to a higher number of observations
based PCA; but, for a technical purpose, (i.e. initial number of points on
our total dataset), we cannot analyze previous breaking point with a model
based on a high number of observations.
We can observe in Figure III.12 two breaking points; one in September 2012
and another one in December 2013. Indeed the period until September 2012
can be resumed by a high negative trend and low volatility; the period be-
tween September 2012 and December 2013 has a flat trend a high volatility
while the period starting in December 2013 has a negative trend and low
volatility around this trend. Figure III.13 confirms our intuition on the poor
capacity of adaptation of the de-noising method to regime switching as we
can notice that September 2012 and December 2013 are followed by bad
prevision provided by the de-noising method.
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Figure III.13: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
300 observations and 4 factors- from February 2012 to December 2014
To conclude, the tested de-noising method can add information on the pre-
diction process only if we use enough data points in the learning sample of
PCA on a stable period without regime switching.
We focused on the evolution of the prevision error of the 4 factors PCA. We
represent this evolution for the 3 and the 5 factors PCA for 400 observations
and 900 observations to understand to impacts of adding components in the
PCA.
In the 3 factors PCA, the performance of both methods (with Kalman and
without) is similar for 900 observations learning sample and is quite similar
for 400 observations (the naive PCA is slightly better in the post August
2014 period said regime 2 in what follows). For the 400 observations based
models, when we add the 4th component on regime 1 (pre August 2014) the
performance of the Kalman based method is highly improved. On regime 2,
the impact is negative, the we lose performances. For the naive PCA, the
impacts are positive (but less than in the Kalman PCA method) on regime 1
and neutral on regime 2. The effect 5th component is neutral on the regime
1 for Kalman PCA and naive PCA. On regime 2, the impact is negative for
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Figure III.14: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
900 observations and 3 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
the Kalman PCA whereas it has no effect for naive PCA.
For the 900 based models, the results are quite similar to those of the 400
based models. Mainly, we can observe that including the 4th component per-
mits to improve the performance of the Kalman PCA compared to the naive
PCA on regime 1 whereas the two methods performances are not impacted
in regime 2 and so have same performance on this period as in the 3 factors
models.
One of the input of our model that we have not consider above is the number
of points of the interest rates curve that we choose. We compute all the
different back-tests based on 4 points of the interest rates curve. As we
also conclude that 4 factors models are the best fitting models, we can ask
ourselves if the optimal number of factors is not linked to the number of points
of the interest rates curve that we have selected. To obtain an answer to this
question, we launch our back-testing algorithm with 3 points of interest rates
curve as input: 2 years, 10 years and 20 years. We drop the 5 years point that
seems to be the worst information provider. We fix 400 observations in the
learning sample of PCA for a backtest window of 150 points (as considered
above).
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Figure III.15: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
900 observations and 4 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
Figure III.16: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
900 observations and 5 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
Table III.5: backtesting for the prevision based on 2y, 10y and 20y points of
interest rates curve
Method 2 factors 3 factors 4 factors 5 factors
PCA 61.73 61.05 58.74 60.74
PCA Kalman 62.03 60.79 63.87 70.35
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Figure III.17: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
400 observations and 3 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
Figure III.18: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
400 observations and 4 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
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Figure III.19: Prevision errors for PCA and Kalman PCA models based on
400 observations and 5 factors - from May 2014 to December 2014
As shown by Table 5, the quality of the prevision is lower than in a 4 points
of yield curve and the optimal number of factors is still 4 factors based PCA.
This means that the selected number of points for representing the interest
rates curve and the optimal number of factors in the PCA are not directly
linked.
3 Macro-Stressed Pricing of Bermuda Swap-
tions
3.1 About the Pricing of the Bermuda Swaption
For all the details on the pricing process of the Bermuda Swaption, we refer
to the paper of Erkan and Prigent [8]. We just recall in this section the most
important notions and definitions in order to make the reading of this paper
possible without reading [8].
A Bermuda swaption is an option that permits us to enter in a swap at
different dates. The difficulty of the pricing is coming from the presence of
103
different possible call dates. The payoff of the product is then depending on
the optimal execution date. To calculate the expected value of this payoff,
we have to solve an optimal control problem. The lecturer can ask “why this
derivative option and not another one (by example like ranged accrual CMS)
is concerned by this paper”. As we have specified at the beginning of the
chapter, we do our study in the skill of a buy side actor. It is quite common
for a buy-side actor to make a micro-hedging strategy with the use of asset
swap. We buy/issue a bond with complex payoff and we are long a swap
which cancels the complex cash-flows of our bond and pays/makes us pay a
local floating rate if we have bought/issued the bond. This micro-hedging
can preserve us from different complex interest rates of the bond but if the
considered bond is a Bermuda concealable bond, we cannot actually hedge
the risk coming from the undetermined redemption date. Then, it is inter-
esting to study the price and the estimated call date in different preselected
macro-scenarios.
We want to obtain the price of a Bermuda swaption callable every year and
with final maturity of the underlying swap in 11 years. We are at 12/31/2014
and we want to estimate the price at 12/31/2015. The previous section gives
us the estimation of our future risk factors. We perform our pricing in a LMM
1 factor model and compute the pricing with a Least-Square Monte Carlo
(Longstaff-Schwartz). We use the different projected risk factors (interest
rates and volatility) to price in each macroeconomic scenario.
3.2 Pricing for the Different Projected Risk Factors
We expose the different prices for all the scenarios, reduction models and
selected reduced dimensions. Our learning sample is composed by 5 000
paths and our valuation sample by 30 000 paths. Figure III.14 resumes all
this information. We can observe that for each scenario the choice of the
model and dimension does not impact significantly the price of our product.
104
Figure III.20: Price of the option
scenarios FM PCA
4 F 10 F 20 F 4 PC 10 PC 20 PC
Central Scenario 5.66% 5.69% 5.71% 5.66% 5.69% 5.69%
Deflation 10.00% 9.99% 9.98% 10.01% 10.02% 10.03%
Bond Crash 0.03% 0.04% 0.04% 0.03% 0.04% 0.04%
Figure III.21: Estimated option’s maturity (if executed)
scenarios FM PCA
4 F 10 F 20 F 4 PC 10 PC 20 PC
Central Scenario 2.71 2.74 2.69 2.68 2.75 2.74
Deflation 1.73 1.72 1.76 1.69 1.73 1.73
Bond Crash 7.24 7.34 7.31 6.97 7.40 7.33
The difference between the different configuration is about few bps. We also
represent the estimated optimal maturity date of the option for the different
configurations in Figure III.15. We estimate it by the empirical average of
the simulated execution dates over all the sample of our Monte Carlo simu-
lations. We can assert that Factor Model or PCA gives similar results and
in the context of dimension reduction of the implied volatility matrix the
output will be independent of the chosen method. For the dimension, as the
4 factors/components reduction gives a very close price compared to higher
dimensions, it seems more suitable to choose the lower dimension to ex-
plain the implied volatility matrix. This result highlights the uselessness of a
high dimension (full dimension) model to explain a highly correlated implied
volatility matrix. To resume, we can say that all the entries of our implied
volatility matrix can be seen as a mixture of a few (here we choose ran-
domly 4) independent variables without losing significant information about
the data.
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3.3 Uncertain Parameters Model
In this section, instead of pricing for different risk factors, we build an un-
certain parameters model (in spirit of Brigo-Mercurio[3]). This model takes
account of the uncertainty of the risk factors and models them by random
variables. This implies to define probability for each scenario. This point
is not so trivial. The logic and hypothesis of our model completely change
when we span our scenarios in a probabilistic world. This implies indeed to
pass from a notion of uncertainty to a notion of risk (c.f. Rebonato [11]). We
discuss this point further in the next chapter. In what follows, we consider
probabilized scenarios counter to the scenario based modeling of first part of
this chapter.
The values of the risk factors are known immediately after time zero. For
each path of our Monte Carlo simulation and before launching the simula-
tion of the trajectory, we have to determine in which scenario we are. We
have first to assign probability of occurrence to the different macro-scenarios:
Central Scenario appear with a probability of p
1
, Deflation Scenario with a
probability of p
2
and finally Bond Crash with a probability of p
3
. We simu-
late an uniformly distributed variable U taking values in [0, 1]. If U is t in
the interval [0, p
1
], we do the simulation with the risk factors of the Central
Scenario, for a value of U in ]p
1
, p
2
+ p
1
] we consider the risk factors of the
Deflation Scenario and, if U is inside the interval ]p
2
+ p
1
, 1] it will be the risk
factors of Bond Crash Scenario. Once we have the realization of this variable
for all paths, the algorithm is the same than in the standard LMM. Each
scenario uses specific risk factors (interest rates and volatility) depending on
the realization of the state variable.
We price our product with 10 000 paths for the learning sample and 150
000 paths for the valuation sample. We use the PCA with 3 Principal Com-
ponents for dimension reduction of the volatility matrix. We fix p
1
= 0.5,
p
2
= 0.35 and p
3
= 0.15. The price of the product on our uncertain parame-
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Figure III.22: Price in the uncertain parameters model and the weighted
average price
Central Deflation Bond Crash Weighted Average UPM
Prices 5.65% 10.01% 0.03% 6.33% 6.32%
ters model is 6.33%.
We can compare the price of our model with a naive average of the price
in each scenario weighted by the probability of accuracy. We perform the
pricing for each scenario with 10 000 paths for the learning sample and 50
000 paths for the valuation sample. As we can see on Figure III.16, the
weighted average is equal to the price issued by the uncertain parameters
model. The two methods give the same result. This means that the optimal
control part of our Monte Carlo is not affected by a sample where there are
different regimes and so the data are more volatile. This can be explained
by the linearity of the scenario projection. The non-linearity coming from
the optionality does not affect the choice of the methods (an ex-post mean
or an uncertain parameters model) because this uncertainty is outside of the
pricing process.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper, we focus on a forward looking approach to estimate future value
of a derivative product. When we price an option, we take care only about
the information of the valuation date. The calibration step of the pricing
allows us to fit the data of the current date. The different hypothesis behind
derivatives pricing allow us to resume the information by the quotation of the
day. As the calibrated variables change every day, this shows the non-stability
of our modeling. The objective of our approach is to include our vision on the
future in the estimation of future price of our option. As we know that our
risk factors (here interest rates and volatility) are not constant and extreme
values of these risk factors are non-negligible, we decide to estimate the price
of our product for next year with macro projection of these risk factors.
In the first part, we detail the selected macroeconomic scenarios and how
we project the implied volatility matrix according to this scenarios. As the
dimension of the implied volatility matrix is quite high, we chose to use
dimension reduction technique. We compare the Factor Model and Principal
Component Analysis. We detail the numerical results for this two methods
and for different dimensions. The two methods give similar results. We
estimate the latent factors with the predicted value of the Kalman filter
(instead of the filtered value) used as a de-noising method. We deduce from
the numerical results that the de-noising method is not adapted to regime
switching and gives low quality predictions after a regime switch. On the
other hand, in a stable economic context, the Kalman method gives better
results than the standard PCA method.
The second part of the paper applies the macro stressing to the pricing
of a Bermuda swaption. Similarly to the results on the implied volatility,
the price is not affected by the chosen model and dimension. First, we
calculate distinctly the 3 prices for each scenario with the respective risk
factors. We also build an Uncertain Parameters Model taking account of
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the three scenarios with their probabilities of accuracy. This model gives us
one price which aggregates our 3 anticipated macroeconomics scenarios. We
compare this price with the probability weighted average of the 3 distinct
valuations. The two prices (averaged and Uncertain Parameters Model) are
similar. This means that learning algorithm is not affected by including
uncertain parameters in the modeling. This similar price can be explained
by the absence of non-linearity before the pricing of the option. The non-
linear problem appears only on the second step: pricing of the option and
not on the scenario generation.
We propose a method based on classical statistical tools (PCA or factor
model) to project the implied volatility according to the interest rates sce-
narios. The easy computation (as easy as the other satellite models used in
stress-testing) can permit the fast implementation of the method. Compared
to actual treatment of the implied volatility in stress-tests (increase of 25%
and deterministic short-cut), it has the advantage to give a result with an
economic sense.
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Part IV
Stress-testing as a Core Tool for
Financial Institutions
Management
Abstract
Stress-tests have become a major tool to manage the strategic ori-
entations of a financial institution and especially banking Groups. The
present paper analyzes the logic behind stress-testing. We present the
different steps composing stress-testing from the scenarios definition to
the impact on the activity of the Institution with a focus on the logic
and hypothesis behind the choose of this tool. After this “tool focus”
part, we analyze modeling hypothesis behind stress-testing. As a buy
product, we bridge the gap between derivatives pricing grounded on
risk-neutral modeling and stress-testing based on scenarios analysis.
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Introduction
Managing financial institutions is a quite complex issue. We are facing chang-
ing economic and financial environments. The different breakdowns of our
environment make the risks and performance’s management of on financial
institution difficult. The banks have to adapt their business plans to take
account of the specificity of the current economic situation (eg: low interest
rates, low market index, deflation,...). Crisis can come very quickly compared
to the reactivity of a bank to change the strategic orientation of its activities.
Let us define specific macroeconomic and financial context as a regime. The
risks, performance, capital and liquidity of an institution can be managed by
the usual quantitative tools for a given regime. All these models base their
calculations on the indicators of the considered regime. These tools can be
based on a “pseudo” forward-looking logic as in the case of Monte Carlo VaR
or derivative pricing. We qualify them as “pseudo” forward-looking because
they do not actually have a forward-looking logic. If we consider the two
examples that we have given, we simulate future realizations of the variables
but only with past (VaR) or current (derivatives pricing) information. These
models combine the input information with random simulations to produce
estimations for the future. These tools are adapted to manage the activities
of the institution for a given regime of the financial and economic environ-
ment. The question that we are facing here is: how managing the banking
Groups taking the versatility of our world into account? The regime changes
can make our usual tools becoming outdated.
Stress-testing quantifies the impact of breakdowns in our economy that are
not been captured in the standard tools. The objective is to extend all these
metrics in different regimes taking in consideration the associated scenarios.
It is obviously difficult to consider all possible regimes. To make the analysis
possible, it used to choose two or three scenarios that can appear in a defined
time horizon. Generally, a small number of scenarios are build including one
113
baseline scenario which is different from the market forward scenario. The
presence of baseline scenario as the benchmark scenario shows the difference
of logic between other tools where the market anticipations are the reference.
The stress-testing brings this forward-looking view with taking account of our
intuition on the evolution of our environment, which is really different from
repeating the past or following current market information. Nevertheless
it is possible in the scenarios planning part of stress-testing to repeat the
past crisis (we discuss with more details this point in the following section).
One of the important features of stress-testing is that it takes account of
the specific opinions of the stress-tester. We are not only mixing modeling
with market information (current or past). Including stress-testers views
in the engine allows us to add real plus-value into the results and in its
interpretation/uses.
Stress-testing is widely used in the context of prudential supervisory as a
part of Supervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP). It permits to
make projections of the equity ratio in a regime built on extreme events. It is
clearly a supervision of tail risks in the management of the solvency. Solvency
is the central notion in the management of financial institutions. It reflects
the ability for our corporation to honor its obligations and to continue its
activities and expansions. Combining the capital adequacy analysis with the
P&L of the bank gives strong information on the situation of the bank to the
senior managers.
Stress-testing brings key elements of answers also for strategic and financial
planning. It permits to analyze the deformation of P&L incomes and risk ex-
posure in different regimes and/or strategic changes. These strategic changes
can be the loss of one market (because of an offensive of a concurrent in a
specific area) or a gain in another market (thanks to an acquisition).
As stress-testing requires the projection of balance sheet, we need to project
in particular the debts of the bank. These debts contain structured securi-
ties and related derivatives. Projecting these complex products requires to
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connect scenarios based projection and risk neutral modeling.
First, we expose the context in which the stress-testing is widely used for
bank monitoring. In the second part, we present the whole process of stress-
testing from the scenarios planning to the solvency ratio calculation. Section
3 is dedicated to the modeling hypothesis behind stress testing. The last
section compares the compatibility of stress-testing with risk-neutral model-
ing to bring elements of analysis to structured notes and derivatives stressed
projection.
1 Stress-Testing Contexts
1.1 Supervisory Framework
The regulators focus on two major three elements of banks: solvency, liquidity
and resolution. When ECB focus on solvency and liquidity level, the SRB
focus on the resolution. ECB fixes capital requirement to avoid any problem
of failure which can impact the ratepayers by intermediate of the States,
the creditors of the bank and the whole financial system (the contagion to
others banks). If despite the effort on solvency the bank fails, to avoid a
repercussion on the ratepayers the resolution have fix a level of MREL: a
ratio of capital and bail-able debts. It permits more concretely to cancel the
debts of bank (bail-in) following a rank of subordination of the creditors.
The stress-test is the tool used on solvency calibration to take account of on
capital requirement the consequences of a future crisis.
During recent years, stress-testing has gained importance in the supervi-
sory of the banks, see Schuermann [15]. One of the main subject treated
in management board comity is definitively solvency stress-testing. Indeed,
the result stress-testing is crucial as it determines the equity ratio of the
bank and then its capitalistic structure imposed by the regulator. The result
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of (regulatory) stress-test affects also the market value of the Group as the
impact is published by the ECB. In the case of bad results, the impact of
the publication can be drastic if the Group owns quoted subsidiaries or are
directly quoted. Indeed stressed solvency seems to be a good metric to assess
coherent capital structure given the risk appetite of the bank. The notion of
risk appetite is central notion in stress-testing because it permits to fix the
probability of failure that the bank accepts as defined by Schulermann [15].
If the banks have “optimal” (not to say “high”) level of capital ratio, in case
of losses they can honor their debts. More the funding comes from capital
and less the bank are subject to propagate failures in the market. The idea
of Basel is to identify the different risks and to adapt the level of capital to
the calculated risk level. We calculate risks from different origins (essentially
classed in credit, market, funding, operational and business) and deduce in
counterpart the level of capital ratio as the ratio is calculated in terms of
RWA (equity on RWA).
For solvency stress-testing, we can mention two stress-tests. We call exter-
nal stress-test or top-down stress test, when the exercise is carried out by
macro-prudential authorities. The assumptions and scenarios are common
to the whole panel of banks. The aim of this stress test is to stress the
macro-financial system in its entirety, that’ iswhy it is important to have
homogeneity for the assumptions, methodology and scenarios. This external
stress-test is called EBA stress-test as it is designed by the EBA and its
results are publish by the ECB. The EBA stress test is a part of the Su-
pervisory Review and Evaluation Process (SREP) as part of the Pillar 2 of
Basel Accords. While the methodology and the scenarios are determined by
EBA, the modeling challenge into the bank is less important. The biggest
challenge is to adapt internal system and organization to be able to do the
stress-test as defined by EBA.
The internal stress test is the second type of stress-test. It is a part of
Internal Capital Adequacy Assessment Process (ICAAP). Indeed the ICAAP
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document which describes it capital adequacy with a focus on risk that is not
covered by the Pillar 1 capital requirements. The internal stress-test is one
of the element provided in ICAAP as a supplementary measure of risk. Bank
fix the scenarios and methodology of this stress-test. It permits to be more
confident for the results compared to those obtained in the EBA stress-test.
The regulator have also the advantage to have both results and can compare
them.
1.2 Internal Management
In addition to the regulatory needs, stress-testing and more generally sce-
nario based analysis are also very useful for internal management of the scale
resources of the bank. Indeed it is quite common to use scenarios analysis to
determine the adequate strategical position of the bank. The usual examined
variables are earnings and balance sheet based variables. As we usually do
in finance, we want to report us in a profitability / risk couple and add the
liquidity constraint.
For example in ALM, the net interest income is an indicator of profitability
and the sensitivity of balance sheet’s net present value is an indicator of risks.
This NPV of the balance sheet can be determined in deterministic (as a sen-
sitivity to a shock) or stochastic (as an economic capital) manner. Stressing
this profitability - risk couple permits to take account of the sensitivity of
the financial management to different macroeconomic shocks.
More generally in financial planning, a steering of scale resources is performed
and the scenario based approach is the central tool. For the incomes, the
realized incomes are compared to the expectation and if there are a non
negligible differences, the spread is explained given the non expected events.
The capital management, in the sense of optimal allocation of capital, is also
performed with scenario based approach.
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The scenario based and stress-testing are also central for M&A purposes. To
analyze the relevance of an acquisition, it is common to project different rep-
resentative variable on profitability and solvability in different scenarios. We
consider a baseline scenario, a worst case scenario and a good case scenario.
The decision of the acquisition is taken considering the baseline and under
the risk to fall in the worst case scenario. In others words, the return is those
of baseline scenario and the risk associated is those of worst case scenario.
The decision of the acquisition is to decide if the benefit in the baseline sce-
nario is more important than the risk to fall in the worst case scenario. We
can notice that this scenario based approach add a real economic logic to
the modeling compared to a alternative method where we would simulate
in a Monte Carlo method. The relevance of the method is widely based on
the quality of the scenarios as the approach is judgment based. We can also
remark the absence of probability as in the scenario based method it is quite
difficult to add probability as we analyze in following sections.
Let’s note that for insurance companies and financial institutions specialized
on asset management, the related challenge is focus on strategic allocation
given this profitability - risk couples in different scenarios as the business
model of these companies are to invest in market.
To summary, stress-testing is adapted when we want to perform usual cal-
culus on balance sheet position, incomes statements and risks in a stressed
situation to take account of the variability of our environment. Stress-testing
can be opposed to modeling as instead of modeling specific risks by an eco-
nomic capital it is possible to proceed by stressing the whole system to take
account of all possible risks.
Of course different stress-testing is possible. We expose in what follows the
details of a solvency stress-testing to give an example of a wide stress-testing
which needs to project almost all the variables of a bank. Solvency is very
central and controlled by the regulator and investors since the crisis. Even
if the solvency stays a very important indicators, we have to precise that
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today the investors and regulator (which is the main focus of the business
model analysis of SREP and so of solvency requirements) are increasingly
interested by profitability. The low interest rates context, where the NII of
banks are in difficulty, put this scale resource (profitability) more and more
in foreground.
2 Solvency Stress-Testing: from scenario plan-
ning to impact analysis
In this section, we expose all the steps to build stress-tests. Stress-testing is
a quite long and transverse tool. It requires knowledge from different area:
economics, risk, capital structure, prudential requirements, PnL (included
asset and liability management). If we took the specific example of solvency
stress-testing, we need to involve in the stress-tests many different teams
from different departments of the Group. These high heterogeneity implies
to attribute each step to a team of specialist in this specific domain.
2.1 Scenario Planning
The first pillar that represents the grounding of all the following steps is the
scenario planning also called macro-financial scenario design [5]. It is perhaps
the most important part of the stress-test as the reliability and quality of
the test is at best the reliability and quality of the designed scenarios. All
the results will be linked to these scenarios and if we planned poor quality
scenarios, the plus value of our stress test will be low even if we perform
high-quality methods in the following parts.
We first have to identify macro-financial risks. There are two different ways
to fix theses risks.
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We can use historical risks that we already observe in the past and have
affected our macro-financial system. To name just a few, we can list October
1987, Asiatic crisis, 11. September 2001, Lehman bankruptcy. The biggest
lack of this approach is, as highlighted by Schuermann [15], that it not test
for “anything new”.
The second way of risks identifying is to do it hypothetically. Given the
current macro-financial situation, we (by we, I mean economists) select some
risks (or just one) that we can face in the future (future being defined by
the horizon of our stress-test). For example, at the writing date of this
paper, we can mention Brexit or growing of shadow banking sector (this risk
is one of the four risks identified by the EBA for the 2016 EBA stress-test
[6]). The identified risks should be appropriated with consistent impacts but
need to be plausible at all. This arbitrage between severity and plausibility
is important for the use and reliability of the stress-test. We recall that
generally not assign probabilities to the scenarios. We discuss this question
of probabilities in details in the section 3.
Once we get the different systematic risks, we have to quantify the impacts
on several directly related macro-financial variables. In other words, we have
to pass from risks to shocks on core variables (here we use “core” in the sense
of directly related to the planned risks). This shock profile (as named by
ECB[5]) can be calibrated in different manners. It can be done without use
of models, based on historical reactions of these variables to past crisis. A
second method is the use of historical distribution in a VaR based calculation.
And of course, we can use model to calibrate the size of the shocks, supposing
that the variations explained by the model is the natural evolution and the
variability coming from residuals is interpreted as shocks.
The next step consists in expending the perimeter to all macro-financial
variables. We can mention two approaches.
In the first approach, we use simple linear regressions to project all the vari-
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ables. The must subtle part of this method is the selection of explanatory
variables. The number of explanatory variables must be consistent with the
number of observations. This selection of these independent variables can be
specified by the economist without a quantitative study or it can be done by
an algorithm selection (eg. forward regression, lasso regression,...).
In the second approach, we use a dynamic macro-econometric models. These
models are those that have been developped by regulators in the context of
monetary policy. We can mention Global Vector Autoregressive Model or
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Model as the most popular ap-
proaches. We will not enter on the details of these models, the interested
lecturers can read ECB paper [4] for further details. The principal idea is
that these models expand the perimeters of our variables and the projections
are based on macroeconomic equilibrium assumptions. With this last step,
we obtain the final output of our scenario planning: the projected values
of all the macro-financial variables associated with the risks that we have
identified.
2.2 Projecting Core Variables of the Bank by Top-Down
Satellite Models
The scenario planning permits us to obtain the state of our economy and
financial market given the identified risk that we “think” plausible. This is,
as we said, the first pillar of our stress-test. We know want to obtain the
values of the different variables that represent the health of the bank. These
“core variables” of the bank are the different risk exposures on its balance
sheet, the profitability and the capital. In other words, we want to project
the PnL/capital and the risk of the bank given the structure of its balance
sheet. Indeed the balance sheet structure of the bank is a representation of
its business model and resumes also its risk appetite. On one side we have
the PnL generated by its activities and on the other side we have the risk
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that it takes to generate this profit (if PnL is positive). Additionally to this
PnL/Risk duality at a point in time, we also have the level of capital as a
pillow to absorb shocks. We can do a little reminder and precise that the
capital is essentially composed (without going into the restatements details)
by the equity and the reserve, reserve in the sens of the accumulation of
past PnL that we had not distributed to shareholders. We go further in all
these notions in the next section dedicated to the consolidation and impact
calculation.
The top-down models used to projected these risks and PnL elements can
be very heterogeneous and specific to the considered variables. We do not
project the NII (net interest income) in the same manner than we project
the LGD and PD for credit risk. The core variables projections are related to
the different hypothesis and logic behind the initial modeling of the studied
risk/variable.
When the macro-financial variables are direct risk factors on the modeling of
the core variable (as it is the case in ALM for NII calculation), we can inject
the projected values of the macro-financial variables in the modeling of our
core variable instead of the current or baseline values of the initial model.
For other core variables, we can have no direct link between the macro-
financial variables and the input of risk/PnL calculation models. In this
case, we need to project core variables. These projections can be done by
simple linear regression (with a special attention to explanatory variables
selection) or as advised by ECB [5] with a Bayesian model averaging ap-
proach. This Bayesian method’s logic consist to suppose that all the simple
linear regression models are possible but uncertain. We do not select one
model but use all the possible models and specify probabilities to all mod-
els. The probability of one model is related to its fitting quality (generally
Bayesian Information Criterion: BIC). The models with high BIC have a
high probability of occurrence and this implies that the estimated values of
the regression’s coefficients are more weighted by the values of the coefficients
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in theses more plausible models. For further details on Bayesian averaging
models we refer to Sala-Doppelhofer-Miller [13].
As we expect, this part of the stress-testing process is calculated by the
different risk and financial departments teams and each team focus on its
specialty. Credit risks team is affected to the calculation of the credit risk
component, ALM team the NII, market risk the stressed VaR, ...
In addition of these core variables, we need intermediate variables projections
as balance sheet evolution in the case of a dynamic balance sheet assumption.
The different core variables that we need to projected are:
• Credit risk RWA
• Market risk RWA
• Operational risk RWA
• NII
• other PnL elements (as Commissions, fees, expenses,...)
• NTI (net trading income)
As the different calculation models can be complex and long to describe, we
do not detail the modeling of these variables.
2.3 Solvency Calculation
Once we obtain the different core variables, we need to consolidate the pro-
jections and resume the health of the bank with an unique variable. As we
said in the beginning of our paper, our stress-test is a solvency stress-test.
The solvency can be viewed as a representative metric for the stability of the
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bank. In fact, if the bank is solvent, it can continue its activities and honor
its commitments.
The final output variable of our stress-testing is the core equity tier one ratio
(CET 1 ratio) which stands as a metric of the solvency of the bank.
The following formula gives us the level of CET1 ratio:
CET1 =
Capital +Net Operating Income
RWA
.
The different modules projections give the inputs to calculate this ratio.
The CET 1 ratio is based on the core capital composed of equity and non
distributed earnings. We also calculate solvency ratios for broader definition
of capital. Indeed, we can include additional Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital in the
calculation of the ratio.
More generally, the regulator fixes different ratio levels which regulate these
different debt instruments. For example, the Pillar 2 of Basel is focus on
core capital while the MREL is focus on T1, T2 and other ”bail-in-able”
instruments.
To resume, stress testing is based on the capitalistic structure of our balance
sheet, balance sheet that generates profitability and risk exposure. Once we
project our balance sheet, we have to measure the impact depending on the
axis that we want to focus: solvency, capacity of bail-in, ...
3 Modeling Hypothesis behind Stress-Testing
We presented how we perform stress-testing in the previous section. Now we
analyze the hypothesis behind this tool. To make good use of the outcome
of our stress-testing and take appropriate decisions, we have to understand
the fundamentals on which the tool is based. As highlighted by Rebonato
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[12], stress-testing is grounded on the Keynesian uncertainty framework as
opposed to the probabilistic worlds in which we use to model in finance.
As a reminder, Keynes opposes risk and uncertainty. The notion of risk is
employed when we have a perfect knowledge of the probabilities associated
with future events while Keynes uses the term uncertainty when we do not
know exactly theses probabilities.
Financial modeling is generally based on the notion of risk with intensive
use of probabilities. Rebonato [12] notices the quantitative potential of the
framework set up in the Keynesian risk. Financial modeling is generally split
in two areas. It is common to oppose Q world to P world [7]. The Q world
based modeling is used to price derivatives. In this context, we use present
information on quoted products (in other words products for which price is
available) and interpolate other non quoted ( and more complex) products.
Nevertheless, the use of historical information is possible if we have free
parameters as correlations in certain cases. This Q world modeling is based
on the famous hypothesis of “absence of arbitrage opportunity”. We are in a
logic of interpolation and not prediction. The pricing of a financial product
is given by the market quotations as the fair price viewed by the market.
We just expend this logic to obtain the fair price of more complex and not
directly quoted products. As highlighted by El Karoui-Loisel-Prigent-Vedani
[9], the use of Q world is subject to different hypothesis as the systematic use
of hedging strategic and a short term consideration. Indeed everyone knowns
the mismatching of the Q world modeling with the stylized facts, however
the modeling gives acceptable result and can be consider as true locally in
space and time. This implies that we need frequent (to take account the
limit in time) calibrations for each type of product (to take account the limit
in space).
As opposed to this Q world modeling, the P world modeling is used in asset
management and risk management. The aim of this approach is to predict
the future. We look at the past history and estimate the future based on the
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information contained on this history. The hypothesis behind this approach is
very different from the hypothesis in derivative pricing. In derivative pricing,
we set the fact that estimation of future is present (because market permits
us to buy forward contract on the underlying) and in asset/risk modeling we
focus on predictions on the spread between present and future (because we
focus on best estimation). Even if the hypothesis are very different we build
in both cases probabilistic world in the sense of Keynesian risk.
On the other side, we have uncertainty and more specifically scenario anal-
ysis. This modeling is common in corporate finance, investment banking
and accounting. As other tools of these areas, stress-testing is based on this
scenario based approach. We do not assign probabilities on future possible
realizations. We select plausible and interesting scenarios as described on
the previous section. We focus on the outcomes given the specific scenario.
The biggest difference with the risk based modeling is the central place of
subjectivity. We can wonder on the plus value of these uncertainty based
approach. The presence of subjectivity is the key element of the answer.
As remarked by number of authors, the past does not repeat itself (cf Taleb
[15]). The occurrence of non predictable events makes the prediction of the
future based on past difficult. To fix this problem, we add subjectivity with
scenario based approach. The biggest weakness of this approach is the lack
of probability. As remarked by Rebonato [12], in the case of stress testing,
we know how much we can lose but we do not have an idea on the probability
associated to this loss. Giving a level of loss without giving the occurrence
makes difficult the use of the outcome by the management body.
We can wonder on the assessment of probability on the two or three selected
scenarios. The scenario based analysis is build on picked scenarios (scenarios
that are plausible and with enough severity). Assigning probability on these
scenarios are very difficult task as we are working with subjective probabil-
ities and fictive scenarios that we can not calibrate with the past (as we do
for risk based approach). Even if Rebonato explores Bayesian modeling to
126
assess probabilities on our stress-tests [12], the banking Groups do not use to-
day probabilities when they perform stress-testing. The ECB does not claim
probability neither in the context of supervisory stress-testing exercise de-
fined by the EBA. In today’s stressed scenarios management, we do not have
a view on probability. First, we can find this approach debatable but we can
defend it by remarking the conservative characteristic. For years, we observe
stressed economic situations that come true one by one. We are not, in our
scenario based tool, tying to analyze all possible futures event or even less to
analyze an average situation given all future possibilities. We want to handle
a crisis situation that can happen and so to analyze our capacity to absorb
the impact. The question that we want to answer is: “if an other crisis would
happen (and it will happen!), how would the robustness of my institution
react?”. If we focus on our soundness given the fact that a crisis happened,
we do not really care about the probability of occurrence of this crisis. Is it
better as we said above to assess probability to this event? Perhaps not in
our angle analysis. It is better to have a knowledge for management body to
attribute a adequate importance on the results of the stress-test even if we
are aware of the poor quality of the estimation of this probability. It seem
to be not necessary if we first of all want to analyze post crisis situation.
We do not want to take account of the fact that perhaps we will not have
a crisis situation tomorrow, we suppose that we will have and just observe
our financial situation. Of course selecting a “good” scenario is crucial in this
modeling. We have to pay attention on the scenario planning step of our
stress-testing.
Stress-testing is based on crisis management with a conservative view be-
cause of the absence of probabilities. We can perhaps criticize this “what if”
approach in different fields (ALM, M&A, ...) but the number of crisis that
we have suffered and the conservative property coming by our focus on cri-
sis management make the tool less debatable compared to other application
areas.
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Figure IV.1: Projection of the discounted value of a tradable instrument
To resume, we can notice that three different approach are possible to project
a variable (with all the properties stated above for each method) which gave
three different output. We represent these three different estimations for
a tradable instrument in Figure IV.1 and a discounted value of a tradable
instrument in Figure IV.2. The discounted value is more adapted in fixed
income market as future non known rates are estimated by forward rates
which are a discounted zero coupon bond (a tradable asset). In equity mar-
ket, we would consider the stock price and not necessarily the discounted
value of stock price. For the risk neutral approach, the discounted value of
the tradable instrument in the future must be estimated by the current value
of this instrument as there is no possibility of free lunch on the market. This
implies that the non discounted value of this instrument must increase and
this increase has to correspond to the interest rate.
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Figure IV.2: Projection of the value of a tradable instrument
4 Compatibility between risk neutral modeling
and scenarios analysis
4.1 Context
We examined the logic behind stress-test compared to other alternative ap-
proaches. The multiplicity of modeling approaches is due to the existence of
an heterogeneous panel of problems in finance. As highlighted by Demey-
Frachot-Riboulet [3], the most telling example is the definition given to inter-
est rate risk. A real misunderstanding can appear between an IR trader and
an asset and liabilities manager on this subject. The trader wants to neutral-
ize the impact of yield curve movements on the valuation of his product (fair
value hedging) while the AL manager wants to neutralize the impact of yield
curve movement on his future cash flows (cash flow hedging). We cannot do
both at the same time. Nevertheless it is important to notice that a hedging
position in ALM, which supposes a placement at fixed rate of deposit, can
be classified in cash flow hedging or fair value hedging as it can be viewed as
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• a hedging of future cash flows versus the floating short rate remunera-
tion provided that we let the deposit in the money market
• a hedging of the fair value of the assets of the bank: loans providing
fixed rate
These two alternative visions of the same hedging position highlight the
specificity of the French banking system in which the asset and liability are
fixed rate instruments. Fixed rate of position can then be viewed as fair value
hedging when having a global vision the balance sheet: asset and liability.
The definition of the risk depends on the considered activity. It seems logic
to secure the market price of a tradable product while it is more suitable to
guarantee future incomes coming from an economic activity. When trader
considers risky to move away from the market rate, the AL manager considers
risky to suffer from the volatility of market rate and even more when the
liabilities of the bank pay fixed rate.
Given the differences between these two fields, we understand the need of
different models to manage the risk. When these two activities stay indepen-
dent, we “just” have to apply the adequate modeling to the specific problem.
The question is more complex when we have to manage problems combining
the two fields. As we have already noticed, financial management of banks
is based on forward looking modeling especially via stress-testing. As de-
tailed on previous sections, we stress core variables of the bank to project
a possible future situation given our selected scenario. These core variables
incorporate also the liabilities of the bank. The liabilities are composed by
different products. If we make a focus on liabilities, we can classify them in
five categories:
• Deposits (non maturing and maturing)
• Securities
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• Financial Liabilities
• Derivatives with negative fair values ( in IFRS, the derivatives appear
in balance sheet).
• Capital
These categories are also those appearing in regulatory reporting on liabilities
(eg. MREL reporting asked by the Single Resolution Board on April/June
2016).
We need to use derivatives pricing specially to valuate structured securities
and all derivatives (those on assets side and liabilities side) when they are
evaluated at fair value hedge. In fair value hedging, the carrying amount
corresponds to the fair values. When the product is structured, we need to
use absence of arbitrage opportunity hypothesis and derivatives pricing to
obtain its price.
When stressing our balance sheet, we face therefore a problem which gath-
ering risk neutral modeling and scenario analysis.
4.2 Fundamental differences
We need to price our derivatives on a projected scenario. We can see this
combination as a two steps modeling: we first model variables with a scenario
projection coherent with our intuition on future risks and our specific risk
appetite and in a second step we model them with absence of arbitrage
opportunity hypothesis given the effective scenario.
We can highlight the difference gap on numerical results coming from these
two modeling because of the inherent hypothesis of each approach. When in
the first modeling step, our scenario based projection gives a baseline and
an adverse case projections, the risk neutral modeling would give the present
value of the variable grounded on martingale hypothesis on the variables.
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If we want to link the different models, we can compare the baseline scenario
with the forward estimation of risk neutral modeling. The adverse scenario
can be compared to a Value-at-Risk estimation for a given probability in the
risk neutral world.
Let first consider the two central estimations. What we call baseline sce-
nario is also very different from the risk neutral as also highlighted by El
Karoui-Loisel-Prigent-Vedani [9]. We can expect a coherence between these
two scenarios as one express the baseline situation (in the sense of most likely
from the bank’s or central bank’s point of view) and the other express the
value estimated by the market given quoted products prices. In practice, we
have very different estimations given by these two approaches. The baseline
estimation can be therefore very distant from the forward rate. The forward
rate does not take account of important postulae on macroeconomics equi-
librium even if the slope and the curvature of the interest rates curve reflect
economic view of the market. The baseline estimation is very different from
the current estimated level because baseline estimates most likely macroe-
conomic situation which differs from the current macroeconomic situation.
In other word, we can observe a difference on time scale focus. The risk
neural estimation is focus on hypothesis on financial market evolution view
given current macroeconomic context as considered the most likely whereas
the baseline estimation is focus on most likely macroeconomic context given
our knowledge on the different macroeconomic cycles. When the market re-
flects the current situation and reports it into future estimation, the baseline
estimation (grounded on his knowledge on the variability of macroeconomic
context) has a long term vision and estimates very different values compared
to current values. The market estimation is short term vision which need
frequent calibration for a specific product and have credibility only if we ef-
fectively hedge position with a replication portfolio, see El Karoui, Loisel,
Prigent and Vedani [9] for more details. In [1] Bergomi highlights that risk
neutral models are motivated by the capacity to measure the impacts (sign
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and size) of different risks on the P&L of a derivative product and have not
capacity of prediction. Kiesel and Rahe [10] define implied volatility as the
market sentiment and use risk neutral information to analyze risk aversion
evolution and forecast future returns. Using risk neutral information to fore-
cast is also studied in depth in Christoffersen, Jacobs and Chang [2]. They
highlight the importance to combine implied volatility to historical return to
improve the quality of previsions in certain situations. However it requires a
mapping of the risk neutral information into the “physical measure”. Their
article [2] gives all the details on this mapping.
To additionally illustrate differences between risk neutral world and scenario
based prevision, we can remark that in our current low (negative) rates en-
vironment the forward rates are also very low whereas the baseline scenarios
anticipates a rise of interest rates levels. We can also add that when ECB
choose to select a baseline where interest rates rise, it is also to have an
unfavorable scenario for the assets of the banks.
The adverse scenario is based on identified economic risks and have no direct
link with the quantile of probabilistic distribution as the VaR is. However it
is possible to relate the adverse scenario to the risk neutral world. Indeed we
can calculate the probability associate to the adverse scenario as a quantile
of the risk neutral distribution of the variable. We thus have an estimation
of the severity of our adverse scenario in a market perspective.
4.3 Mismatch on precision of the models
We combine two models of projection. The first projections model is grounded
on the uncertainty of Keynes and it gives global estimation. The precise value
of this projection is not the real focus of the logic behind our scenario based
approach. The plus value of the output is more the level of the estimation
than the value itself. Indeed, the confidence interval of the projected value
is large. The projection is a subjective value.
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The situation is totally different in the case of derivatives pricing. We are
facing to extremely precise tool giving a very accurate output. To provide
very precise estimation, derivatives pricing use complex methods. For exam-
ple, the construction of continuum of tenors in a Libor Market Model add
complexity in pricing process then we could interpolate very baldly with a
low loss of accuracy. An other example is the calculation of the solution of
the dual problem in the case of bermuda or american option pricing. The
calculation of this price is much more complicated than the initial price cal-
culation, in fact it consists in a Monte Carlo in a Monte Carlo.
The two projection models are very different in term of accuracy. Clearly,
combining these two models gives for our global projection model (ie the
risk neutral price in the projected scenario) the accuracy of the less precise
model.
A practical question is : “How appropriate is it to use a very complex and
time consuming pricing method when the inputs of the pricing are global and
not very precise?”
The answer would depend on the existence of robust pricing tools on IT
systems and the possibility of stressing the parameters. If it is not the case, it
is possible to make different short cuts. The noise introduced by “reasonable”
short cuts would be lower than the initial incertitude around the projected
inputs.
It is important to have in mind that we are pricing financial products for
purposes of balance sheet management and not as usual to delta hedge risky
position on derivatives. The requirement on accuracy is not the same.
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5 An Example of Stress-Test Exercise: 2016
EBA EU-wide Stress-Testing
5.1 Context of the Stress-Test
The EBA Stress-Test results have been published on 29 July 2016. This pub-
lication concludes a quite long and dynamic process which lasted 5 months.
A scope of 51 european banks, which covers 2/3 of the EU banking assets, is
concerned by this exercise. The starting point of the stress is end-2015 and
focus on 3 years period ending in end-2018. This stress-test correspond to
a macro-prudential stress: all the banks are faced to the same methodology
and scenario. It permits to benchmark the different banks to each others and
to test the banking sector’s resilience.
The results of the test are expected to be a part of the 2016 SREP on the
determination of the Pillar 2 level. The 2016 SREP is expected to be quite
different from the 2015 SREP as communicated by the EBA as of 1 July
2016. This forthcoming SREP would split the Pillar 2 capital into Pillar 2
requirement and Pillar 2 guidance.
Banks are expected to meet the P2G which is situated on top of combined
buffer but the non respect of this level would not imply an action of the super-
visor and would not be used to determine the maximum distribution amount
(MDA) trigger which imply restrictions on dividends, AT1 distributions or
bonus.
As highlighted by the ECB, the qualitative outcome of the Stress-Test will
be included in the determination of the P2R, especially in the element of risk
governance; and the quantitative impact of the adverse Stress-Test will be
one input factor into determining the level of P2G. Other more qualitative
elements (bank specific risk profile, measure taken by the bank, ...) would
be also taken account of in the determination of the P2G.
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Then we would now have two additional capital positions, one to cover the
risks not covered by the Pillar 1 (P2R) and one to cover the risks materialize
into a stress scenario (P2G).
5.2 The Scenarios of the Stress-Test
5.2.1 The Baseline Scenario
The baseline scenario is based on the forecasts of the Directorate General
for Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN) of the European Commis-
sion [8]. The DG ECFIN produce three scenarios each year, the 2016 EBA
baseline scenario for most variables are extracted from the autumn forecasts
of European Commission [7]. This publication projects macroeconomic vari-
ables for 2016 and 2017. Year 2018 is extrapolated for the needs of the stress
test. The projections of the publication are obtained through a judgmental
approach while the extrapolation of the thirst year is based on a model based
approach. The European Commission justifies the use of technical assump-
tion 2018 with the argument that the error associated with judgmental ap-
proach grows with the time horizon of projection. Projections of house prices
for the full time horizon (2016/2018) are obtained also by a model based ap-
proach. The macroeconomic variables projections combine both judgmental
and model based forecasts, the two major types of approaches. The inter-
est rates are extracted by the market quotation, we use, as it’s common in
pricing, the forward rates to estimate future rates. In other words, we use
the risk neutral estimation for the baseline scenario based estimation. This
means that in our baseline estimation, we suppose that the non-arbitrage
hypothesis is not violated.
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5.2.2 The Adverse Scenario
As precised in previous sections, adverse scenarios are based on different
risks. Here in the EBA 2016 Stress-Test, the ESRB General Board identifies
4 major risks (cf European Commission [7]). This four risks correspond to
the most likely adverse event that can affect the stability of the financial
system in European Union.
These four risks are the following:
• an abrupt reversal of compressed global risk premia amplified by low
secondary market liquidity;
• weak profitability prospects for banks and insurers in a low nominal
growth environment, amid incomplete balance sheet adjustments;
• rising of debt sustainability concerns in the public and non-financial
private sectors, a mid low nominal growth;
• prospective stress in a rapidly growing shadow banking sector, amplified
by spillover and liquidity risk.
The first risk is the main risk of the adverse scenario which affects the eco-
nomic stability of our financial system. This risk is the source of the others
three risk of the scenario. The realization of the first risk set off the others
risks. This main risk implies a decreasing demand of long term fixed income
instrument and automatically an increase of the long term interest rates as
implied by the equilibrium of supply and demand.
We expose on the following the detailed consequences of the different risks
as exposed by the EBA explanation paper [7].
• an abrupt reversal of compressed global risk premia amplified by low
secondary market liquidity
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– Rising long-term interest rates and risk premia in the United
States and other non-EU advanced economies
– Global equity price shock
– Increase in the VIX volatility index and spillover to emerging mar-
ket economies
– Foreign demand shocks in the EU via weaker world trade
– Exchange rate shocks
– Oil and commodity price shocks
• weak profitability prospects for banks and insurers in a low nominal
growth environment, amid incomplete balance sheet adjustments
– Investment and consumption demand shocks in EU countries
– Residential and commercial property price shocks in EU countries
• rising of debt sustainability concerns in the public and non-financial
private sectors, a mid low nominal growth
– Country-specific shocks to sovereign credit spreads
– Shocks to corporate credit spreads
• prospective stress in a rapidly growing shadow banking sector, amplified
by spillover and liquidity risk
– EU-wide uniform shock to interbank money market rates
– Shocks to EU financial asset prices
– Shocks to financing conditions in EU countries (via shocks to
household nominal wealth and user cost of capital)
As we also precised, from these risks the stress-tester have to attribute shocks
level. The different shocks are detailed in the EBA note.
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Table IV.1: Scenarios of the main economic and financial variable
variables scenario 2015 2016 2017 2018
CAC 40 variations adverse -28% -26.5% -17.6%
baseline 0% 0% 0%
long term french IR adverse 0.9% 1.6% 2% 2%
baseline 0.9% 1.1% 1.3% 1.4%
GDP adverse 1.1% -0.6% -1.1% 0.6%
baseline 1.1% 1.4% 1.7% 1.6%
HICP adverse 0.1% -0.5% 0.5% 1%
baseline 0.1% 0.9% 1.3% 1.6%
EUR 3m adverse 0% 0.3% 0.3% 0.1%
baseline 0% -0.1% 0% 0%
EUR 10Y adverse 0.9% 1.7% 2% 1.8%
baseline 0.9% 1.2% 1.5% 1.6%
We expose in Table 1 the scenarios for the main economic and financial
variables in the both baseline and adverse scenario.
5.3 The Results
An important element in the 2016 stress-test is the absence of a hurdle rates
than banks have to meet. The 2016 stress-test does not result natively to
a pass-fail outcome. Nevertheless the capital ratio of 5.5% + GSIB is con-
sidered as a benchmark for the stressed ratio. Only two banks are below
this benchmark ratio: MPS and Barclays. Nevertheless there are specially
important banks which are very close to this hurdles (here we consider very
close when the difference is near 1%): BNP (stressed ratio:8.51% vs 7.5%) ,
SG (stressed ratio:7.5% vs 6.5%), HSBC (stressed ratio:8.76% vs 8%).
More globally, the banks passed the test without problems and the market
highlights that the stress-test did not really stressed the banks.
We can take a focus on the french banking industry to analyze with more
attention the results.
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Figure IV.3: Projection of CAC 40
Figure IV.4: Projection of GDP
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Figure IV.5: Projection of HIPC
Figure IV.6: Projection of 3 months IR
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Figure IV.7: Projection of 10 years IR
Table IV.2: CET1 Ratio Fully Loaded
Scenario Banks 12-2015 12-2016 12-2017 12-2018
Adverse Europe 12.6 9.8 9.3 9.2
Adverse BNPP 10.9 8.7 8.5 8.5
Adverse GCA 13.7 11.4 10.9 10.5
Adverse BPCE 12.8 10.3 9.6 9.5
Adverse SG 10.9 7.9 7.7 7.5
Adverse Crédit Mutuel 15.6 13.8 13.6 13.4
Adverse LBP 14.5 10.6 10.2 9.8
Baseline Europe 12.6 13.0 13.5 13.8
Baseline BNPP 10.9 11.3 11.7 12.1
Baseline GCA 13.7 13.9 14.4 14.8
Baseline BPCE 12.8 13.3 13.9 14.4
Baseline SG 10.9 11.0 11.3 11.6
Baseline Crédit Mutuel 15.6 16.0 16.3 16.6
Baseline LBP 14.5 14.8 14.9 15.0
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Table IV.3: Total operating income
Scenario Banks 12-2015 12-2016 12-2017 12-2018
Adverse Europe 587 386 428 100 472 591 462 760
Adverse BNPP 41 816 31 399 34 309 33 659
Adverse GCA 29 846 23 271 24 667 23 413
Adverse BPCE 22 670 14 363 17 220 18 511
Adverse SG 27 514 17 057 22 098 21 765
Adverse Crédit Mutuel 14 234 9 700 11 100 10 852
Adverse LBP 5 705 4 859 5 016 4 787
Baseline Europe 587 386 542 772 534 451 527 447
Baseline BNPP 41 816 40 093 39 326 38 970
Baseline GCA 29 846 27 117 26 449 25 957
Baseline BPCE 22 670 21 615 21 516 20 988
Baseline SG 27 514 24 869 24 869 24 869
Baseline Crédit Mutuel 14 234 12 376 11 837 11 644
Baseline LBP 5 705 5 218 5 010 4 851
The central variable is the capital ratio as the stress-test is before all a
solvability stress-testing. The first Table shows the projection of the fully
loaded CET 1 ratio in the baseline and adverse scenario. If we focus on the 4
systematic french banks, we can notice that the non listed banks (GCA and
BPCE) have a better solvability ratio compared to the listed banks (BNPP
and SG). This is due to the higher level ratio at the starting point for the
cooperative banks. It is a fact that capitalistic banks have a more optimized
solvability ratio (in other words less high ratio) because of the requirement
of the shareholder. This optimization in current economic context gives less
pillow for future stressed context. In the cooperative banks, the context is
different. The owner of the “capital” are less implicated in the governance
of the bank and the cost of the capital is less expensive than in a standard
capitalistic structure with market quoted stocks.
Of course the solvability of banks is a key variable and we have to give
attention to all these solvability outcomes, however solvability is not the
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Figure IV.8: Outcomes for French Banks in 2016 EBA Stress-Test
only important indicator for banks. The profitability is also very important
indicator to get a judgment on the wellness of the banks. Table IV.3 exposes
the projections of total operating incomes. The evolution of total operating
income widely depends on the decomposition between net interest income
and fees and commissions. Others sources of revenue are negligible (as net
trading incomes). In fact, the evolution of these two type of incomes can be
perpendicular. If we take a look at the results of banks during 2015, we can
notice the decrease of NII (because of difficult interest rates context) was
offset by an increase in commissions.
We notice that even in the baseline scenario, the total incomes of the banks
are down, it due to the unfavorable context of the baseline scenario for the
NII combined with stress test constraint (no improve of NII is permit).
The Figure IV.8 represents a global vision of the stress test outcome in a prof-
itability/risk logic. The successive crisis forced us to take special attention in
risk but today with the deterioration of the incomes banks begin to consider
also the profitability as a key resource. We expose the stressed CET1 ratio
and the return on regulatory capital in baseline scenario at the end of the
stress-test exercise. The size of the bubbles is related to the impact of the
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stress on the CET1 (stressed point vs starting point).
We can conduct our analyze by considering 3 buckets of banks.
The first bucket is composed by Crédit Mutuel and Banque Postale. These
two banks have low profitability compared to others (french and european
banks). Nonetheless, Crédit Mutuel has the advantage to have a very high
stressed CET1 ratio, almost 50% higher than the european average.
The two remaining buckets contain the biggest french banks in terms of total
asset and also number of clients.
One of this bucket is composed by the non listed banks: Crédit Agricole and
BPCE. Their stressed ratios are higher than european average while their
profitabilities are less than the european banks. In the bucket, BPCE has a
higher profitability than Crédit Agricole ( almost 10%) when Crédit Agricole
has a higher stressed CET1 ratio (a little more than 10%).
The last bucket contains the listed banks: BNP and Société Générale (SG).
These two banks are on the top left of the european average. The profitability
is higher but the stressed ratio is lower. Even if we place these banks in the
same bucket, the outcomes of these banks are very different. Indeed, the
market considers that BNP showed a good performance while it remarks the
low level of stressed ratio of SG. In addition of the higher stressed ratio of
BNP, we can notice its higher profitability. It is important to notice for these
two banks that the lower level of stressed ratio is caused by the optimized level
of starting point. Banks, which obtain better stressed ratio, have a higher
level compared to the “optimized” level even if this higher level implies a
lower profitability.
The advantage of BNP compared to SG is the low sensitivity of its ratio to
the stress combined with a high profitability. The low level of stressed ratio
(low compared to the other french banking groups) of BNP does not really
worry the analysts thanks to the potential of BNP to improve its ratio.
The opacity of the stress-test makes the understanding of this low sensitivity
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for BNP difficult. In fact, it is quite difficult for analysts and others banks to
explain this less sensitive scale resource compared to the market. As stress-
testing results are the outcome of very long process with a high dimensional
data, it is not possible to compare the elements of business model that provide
the outcomes.
6 Conclusion
We present the context of stress-testing. Indeed after the several crisis periods
which affect our economy it became a widely used tool as it tries to capture
period of turbulence. It is also based on a forward looking approach where
we analyze economic risks that can hypothetical and not necessarily linked to
past event. This particularity is important because we mainly observe that
different crisis follow each others but they even reflect different economic
crisis.
After the detailed presentation of stress-testing, we discuss the modeling hy-
pothesis of stress testing and compare it with those of risk neutral pricing.
We highlight the differences, particularly on the absence of probabilistic mea-
sure for stress-testing. We notice that non negligible differences can appear
between a risk neutral anticipation and a (baseline) scenario based estima-
tion. This difference would signify the presence of arbitrage opportunity but
we can argue that the difference come from the difference of aims.
The “best estimation” can depend on its use. When market anticipation
is adapted for pricing tradable derivatives because everyone uses this ap-
proach, using own anticipation is more adapted to management financial
scale resources.
We also point that using scenario based projections for implied volatility and
pricing with a risk-neutral model make the precision of the risk neutral model
being useless. Risk neutral models are complex and give very precise results.
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In the other hand, scenario based projection is very approximative and we
are more interested by the magnitude than the exact number. Combining
the two methods makes us using very precise tool to obtain and to use just
a magnitude.
We end by taking a look at the results of the 2016 EBA stress-test. We notice
that in this kind of exercise, we mostly analyze scale resources and not have
a precise look on balance sheet elements. We can also notice the importance
of stress-testing to benchmark different banks between each others.
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Conclusion Générale
La thèse explore le sujet des stress-tests des valorisations théoriques de pro-
duits optionnels en se plaçant sous différents angles de vue. Néanmoins le
cadre général reste celui de la gestion de bilans des institutions financières.
C’est en effet là que l’étude des stress-tests de produits optionnels prend son
importance comme outil de gestion stratégique du risque mais également de
la performance. La thèse aborde ce vaste sujet en partant du niveau le plus
granulaire pour arriver sur une vision grand angle des problématiques. La
thèse est constituée de trois parties majeures qui sont les chapitres 2 à 4.
Après un chapitre introductif, le chapitre 2 nous permet de rentrer dans les
détails de la valorisation de produits de taux et crédits présentant une option
de remboursements anticipés. Ces produits sont très fréquents notamment
aux passifs des institutions sous forme d’émission long terme. En effet, ce
risque de pré-paiement n’est pas couvert et apporte un problème de liquid-
ité dans le bilan de l’institution. Nous proposons notamment une méthode
d’interpolation endogène à la modélisation des taux forward d’un Libor Mar-
ket Model et la comparons à une méthode d’interpolation ex ante exogène
linéaire sur les volatilités implicites de taux de swap. Nous observons que
cette méthode permet d’obtenir de meilleurs résultats en terme de minimisa-
tion de la distance entre volatilité de taux de swap cotée et volatilité de taux
de swap modélisée. Nous examinons également le cas d’un titre émis en une
devise étrangère qui serait couvert par un swap de devise annulable à nom-
inal croissant. Nous constatons notamment que ce produit est impacté par
les trois marchés d’option du fait de la présence d’un spread de crédit libellé
en devise locale. En effet, en l’absence de ce spread, la propriété “cross de-
vise” du produit disparait pour laisser place à une option en devise étrangère.
Nous étudions la sensibilité de notre produit aux différents marchés d’option
sous l’hypothèse de différentes courbes de spread. Nous constatons que le
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marché des volatilité de swaptions en devise locale a un plus grand impact
sur la valorisation par rapport au volatilité du taux de change.
Dans le chapitre 3, nous nous intéressons à la projection des volatilité im-
plicites dans le cadre de stress-tests ou plus généralement lors d’étude d’impact
par scénarios. Nous suggérons une méthode qui permet d’étendre les scénar-
ios des variables de taux d’intérêt vers les volatilité implicites. Pour cela,
nous sélectionnons certains points de la courbe comme variables explicatives
alors que les variables expliquées sont représentées par un nombre limité de
valeurs propres / facteurs (expliquants une grande partie de la variabilité de
la donnée). Nos variables expliquées étant des variables cachées non directe-
ment observables, nous appliquons les filtres de Kalman afin d’obtenir une
estimation moins bruitée. Dans notre cas, l’application du filtre de Kalman
nous permet d’estimer les variables cachées par les valeurs prédites et non
plus filtrées.
Nous comparons les résultats en appliquant lors d’un back-test nos différentes
méthodes à des données historiques. Les résultats montrent que l’ACP et les
modèles à facteurs donnent des résultats très proches si nous n’appliquons
pas les filtres de Kalman, l’ACP donnant toutefois des résultats très légère-
ment plus performants. Ils réagissent par contre différemment à la méthode
de nettoyage proposée. Nous remarquons notamment que lorsque le nombre
d’observations dans l’ACP est faible, environ 300, la méthode dégrade énor-
mément la qualité de la prévision. Ceci met en lumière les différences entre
ces deux modèles qui a priori pouvaient sembler très proches. Après une
étude des différentes configurations de modélisation, nous en déduisons que
la méthode de nettoyage donne de bons résultats et améliore nos prévisions
lorsque la période ne contient pas de changement de régime. Nous observons
en effet qu’après chaque choc macroéconomique perturbant les relations en-
tre variables, les résultats provenant du modèle avec la méthode du filtre de
Kalman sont dégradés par rapport au modèle sans le filtre de Kalman. La
méthode est efficace si nous avons assez de données dans notre ACP et que
151
ces données représentent un cycle macroéconomique sans choc. La dernière
partie du chapitre applique la modèle de projection à la valorisation d’une
swaption bermudienne.
Le dernier chapitre permet de contextualiser les chapitres précédents en
définissant et illustrant les stress-tests dans le secteur financier. Nous dé-
taillons notamment notre compréhension des hypothèses de modélisation qui
sont derrières les stress-tests. Nous menons également une reflexion sur la
compatibilité des stress de paramètres de marché et de la valorisation des
produits structurés. La dernière partie du chapitre expose en détail les stress-
tests réglementaires de 2016. Nous parcourons cet exercice de la conception
des scénarios jusqu’aux résultats.
La thèse analyse sous différents angles les stress-tests comme outil de pilotage
et gestion de risque structurel des institutions financières. Notre analyse
part du niveau produit et va jusqu’à l’analyse de ces stress-tests au niveau
microprudentiel. Un prolongement de la thèse consiste à étendre l’analyse
au niveau macroprudentiel afin d’analyser les effets sur toute une économie.
En effet, les bilans bancaires contiennent un niveau non négligeable de passif
avec option de remboursement par anticipation; et c’est par ce biais que
les projections de volatilité implicite impactent les indicateurs globaux de
supervision macroprudentielle. Aujourd’hui, les notes méthodologiques de
l’EBA préconisent des raccourcis simplificatrices. Les options à la main des
contreparties sont supposées être exécutées à la première date d’option alors
que les options à la main de la banque ne sont pas exécutées. Une analyse
plus globale à l’échelle européenne apporterait une vision plus panoramique
des impacts de projections des volatilités implicites permettant de valoriser
les produits structurés et de facto de quantifier la liquidité au plus juste dans
le scénario de stress.
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